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DRIVEN TO BANKRUPTCY
Pamela Foohey,* Robert M. Lawless** & DeborahThorne***

Over the last ten years, 15.1 million people owning 16.4
million cars filed for bankruptcy. These cars provided access
to work, education, medical care, childcare, food, and other
life necessities. They were also major household investments,
the most expensive asset most bankruptcy filers owned other
than a house. Using original data from the Consumer
Bankruptcy Project, we document what happens to car
owners and their car loans when they enter bankruptcy. In
brief, we find that people who file bankruptcy own
automobiles at the same rate as the general population and
that they overwhelmingly indicate they want to use
bankruptcy as a tool to keep their automobiles. We further
identify a subset of debtors, constituting about a third of
bankruptcy filers, who come to bankruptcy owning
automobiles and little else. These cases are the most likely to
be filed by people "driven to bankruptcy." We detail what our
results show about how people use consumer bankruptcy and
where the system appears to falter. We conclude with
recommendations on how to remedy these systemic issues as
well as what the future of the automobile marketplace,
particularly subprime auto loans, means for people's
continued use of bankruptcy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last ten years, 15.1 million people filed for bankruptcy,
implying that the bankruptcy courts have dealt with 16.4 million cars
during that same time period.' Although there is substantial
literature on financial distress and home ownership, 2 including
numerous articles about people filing bankruptcy to keep their
homes, 3 the literature on automobile ownership and financial distress

1. The number of persons filing bankruptcy is based on the authors'

calculation from the comprehensive database of all filings at: Integrated
BankruptcyDataDatabase, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fic.gov/research/idb (last
visited May 2, 2020). The calculation adjusts for the number of joint bankruptcy
cases to count the number of persons filing bankruptcy. The number of cars in
bankruptcy is an extrapolation from the data presented in this Article.
2. Some of this literature focuses on the benefits and drawbacks of
households' attempts to accumulate wealth in houses. See, e.g., Jared Ruiz
Bybee, In Defense of Low-Income Homeownership, 5 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 107

(2013); A. Mechele Dickerson, Public Interest, Public Choice, and the Cult of
Homeownership, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843 (2012); Lorna Fox, Re-Possessing
"Home": A Re-Analysis of Gender Homeownership and Debtor Default for
FeministLegal Theory, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 423 (2008); Brent T. White,
Underwaterand Not Walking Away: Shame, Fearand the Social Management of
the Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010). In the wake of the Great
Recession, a large strand of this literature deals with the mortgage market. See,
e.g., KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. McCoy, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011); ADAM J. LEVITIN & SUSAN
M. WACHTER, THE GREAT AMERICAN HOUSING BUBBLE: WHAT WENT WRONG AND
How WE CAN PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE FUTURE (forthcoming 2020);
CHRISTOPHER ODINET,

FORECLOSED:

MORTGAGE

SERVICING AND

THE HIDDEN

ARCHITECTURE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AMERICA (2019); Melissa B. Jacoby, The

Value(s) of ForeclosureLaw Reform, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 511 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Jeremy Berkowitz & Richard Hynes, Bankruptcy Exemptions
and the Market for Mortgage Loans, 42 J.L. & ECON. 809 (1999); Sarah W. Carroll
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is thin, particularly regarding people filing bankruptcy to keep their
automobiles. 4 Using our data from the Consumer Bankruptcy Project
("CBP"), we describe the relationship between automobile ownership,
financial distress, and bankruptcy.5
An automobile is more than just another asset or mere
transportation.
It is access to work, education, medical care,
childcare, family, and other life necessities. 6 Most people who do not
own a car cannot afford one; they did not make a lifestyle choice to go
"car free." 7 Although car ownership rates are lower for Millennials,
evidence suggests the reasons they are "car free" are still more likely
to be economic than a preference. 8 Households without cars have
lower incomes and are more likely to be in poverty . Car ownership

& Wenli Li, The Homeownership Experience of Households in Bankruptcy, 13
CITYSCAPE 113 (2011); A. Mechele Dickerson, Bankruptcy and MortgageLending:
The Homeowner Dilemma, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 19 (2004); John Eggum et al.,
Saving Homes in Bankruptcy: Housing Affordability and Loan Modification, 3
UTAH L. REV. 1123 (2008); Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and
Homeownership Risk, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 323 (2007); Adam J. Levitin, Resolving
the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIs. L.
REV. 565 (2009); Lynn M. LoPucki, House Swaps: A Strategic Bankruptcy
Solution to the ForeclosureCrisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2014); Katherine Porter,
Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121
(2008); Katherine Porter, The Pretend Solution: An Empirical Study of
Bankruptcy Outcomes, 90 TEX. L. REV. 103 (2011); Eric A. Posner & Luigi
Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 Am. L. & ECON.
REV. 575 (2009); Alan M. White & Carolina Reid, Saving Homes? Bankruptcies
and Loan Modifications in the Foreclosure Crisis, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1713 (2013);
Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, 39
J. LEGAL STUD. 33 (2010); Wenli Li & Michelle J. White, Mortgage Default,
Foreclosure, and Bankruptcy (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 15472, 2009); Sumit Agarwal & Changeheng Song, The Impact of the Housing
Crisis on Personal Bankruptcy (Nov. 26, 2017) (unpublished study),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2588145.
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Part IV for details about CBP data.
6. See A Car Is a Necessity, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 13, 2010),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2010/09/13/a-car-is-a-necessity/
(noting
that among twelve everyday consumer products, surveyed Americans described
a car as more necessary than any other item); Laura Bliss, If the Economy Is So
Great, Why Are Car Loan Defaults at a Record High?, CITYLAB (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2019/02/subprime-car-loans-buy-

automobile-lending-debt-trap/582652/ (noting that research shows that having a
car "means your life is likely to be more stable").
7. See Anne E. Brown, Car-Less or Car-Free? Socioeconomic and Mobility
Differences Among Zero-Car Households, 60 TRANSPORT POLY 152, 154 tbl. 1
(2017); Suman K. Mitra & Jean-Daniel M. Saphores, Carlessin California:Green
Choice or Misery?, 65 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 1, 1 (2017).
8. See Nicholas J. Klein & Michael J. Smart, Millennials and Car
Ownership: Less Money, Fewer Cars, 53 TRANSPORT POL'Y 20, 20 (2017).
9. See David A. King et al., The Poverty of the Carless: Toward Universal
Auto Access, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1177
/0739456X18823252.
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increases the probability of employment and number of hours
worked. 10
An automobile is also a major household investment-the most
expensive asset many people will own other than a house. And like a
house, an automobile often comes with a hefty loan." Household
financial distress can threaten automobile ownership and the day-today life stability and upward mobility that car ownership brings. An
August 2019 article published in the Wall Street Journal, detailing
how American families are going deeper into debt to maintain their
middle-class lifestyles, identifies auto loans as one of the main inputs
on households' "accumulated ledger of economic risk." 12
A consideration of automobile ownership, financial distress, and
consumer bankruptcy is particularly timely because auto loan
origination rates have increased significantly over the past several
years. 13 Rising auto loan delinquency and default rates have
accompanied these originations, signaling that American households
may be facing increasingly serious financial problems. When faced
with financial issues, some people will file bankruptcy. And if auto
loans are a key component of people's money troubles, those loans
should appear in and perhaps even drive their bankruptcy cases.
For instance, in 2018, auto loan originations reached an all-time
high annual total of $584 billion, increasing 9 percent from the year
prior. 1 4 This amounts to about $4200 of auto debt per capita, though
auto debt varies from household to household. 15 As of the first

&

10. See Steven Raphael & Lorien Rice, Car Ownership, Employment
Earnings, 52 J. URB. ECON. 109, 127 (2002).
11. See Automobile PurchaseDecisions and Auto Lending, FED. RES. BOARD,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/2016-economic-well-being-of-ushouseholds-in-2015-Automobile-Purchase-Decisions-and-Auto-Lending.htm
(last updated June 14, 2016) (reporting that in 2015, two-thirds of people who
purchased automobiles, new or used, financed their purchase with a loan); Phil

LeBeau, Auto Loans Hit Record, PushingAverage Monthly Car Payments to AllTime Highs, CNBC (June 6, 2019, 2:09 PM), https://www.cnbe.com/2019/06/06
/auto-loans-hit-record-high-sending-borrowers-to-the-used-market.html
(citing
Experian's report that in the first quarter of 2019, the average amounts borrowed
to buy a new or used vehicle were $32,187 and $20,137, respectively).
12. AnnaMaria Andriotis et al., Families Go Deep in Debt to Stay in the
Middle Class, WALL STREET J. (Aug. 1, 2019, 11:35 AM), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/families -go-deep-in-debt-to-stay-in-the-middle-class- 11564673734.
13. Number of Loans Originated, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec.
2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/data-research/consumer-credit-trends
/auto-loans/origination-activity/.
14. QUARTERLY REPORT ON HOUSEHOLD DEBT AND CREDIT 2018: Q4, FED. RES.
BANK OF N.Y.
2 (Feb. 2019), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary
/interactives/householderedit/data/pdf/hhdc_2018q4.pdf.

15.

See Gwynn Guilford, American Car Buyers Are Borrowing like Never

Before-and Missing Plenty of Payments, Too, QUARTZ (Feb. 21, 2017),
https://qz.com/913093/car-loans-in-the-us-have-hit-record-levels-anddelinquencies-are-rising-fast-too/ (reporting data from New York Fed and
Equifax); Jenn Jones, Auto Loan Statistics 2020, LENDINGTREE (Jan. 10, 2020),
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quarter of 2019, the average monthly payments for a new vehicle and
used vehicle were $554 and $391 respectively (both of which
established new highs). 16 Based on data released by the credit
reporting firm Experian, the average loan for a new car has increased
11 percent over the past decade, adjusting for inflation. 17 Overall,
since 2008, the total outstanding auto debt has increased by over 40

percent.

18

Auto loan deficiencies also hit a high in 2018, with 7 million
Americans over ninety days behind on car loan payments. 19 Between
1999 and 2000, only 1.7 million Americans were more than ninety
days behind on their auto loan payments. 20
The blossoming subprime auto loan market has contributed to
the increase in auto loans and deficiencies. 21 In 2018, 31 percent of
new auto loan originations went to borrowers with subprime (below
660) credit scores. 22 In comparison, in 2008, 10 percent of new
mortgage originations went to subprime borrowers. 23 Subprime
borrowers account for many of the delinquencies, and subprime auto
loan delinquencies have risen to a rate worse than that during the
Great Recession. 24
These defaults dramatically affect people's lives. Subprime auto
lender Credit Acceptance has stated that it "expects to repossess 35

-

https://www.lendingtree.com/auto/debt-statistics/ (reporting data based on
borrower age, credit score, and car type).
16. See LeBeau, supra note 11 (reporting Experian data).
17. See Andriotis et al., supra note 12; see also AnnaMaria Andriotis & Ben
Eisen, A $45,000 Loan for a $27,000 Ride: More Borrowers Are Going Underwater
on Car Loans, WALL STREET J. (Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-45000-loan-for-a-27-000-ride-more-borrowers-are-going-underwater-on-car-loans
11573295400 (reporting that a third "of people who traded in cars to buy new
ones in the first nine months of 2019 had negative equity").
18. See Andriotis et al., supra note 12 (reporting data from the Federal
Reserve).

19. Heather Long, A Record 7 Million Americans Are 3 Months Behind on
Their Car Payments, a Red Flag for the Economy, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019,
1:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/02/12/record-millionamericans-are-months-behind-their-car-payments-red-flag-economy/
(interpreting the Federal Reserve of New York Q4 report to show that 7 million
Americans are ninety days delinquent on their auto loans); see FED. RES. BANK OF
N.Y., supra note 14.
20. See Gabrielle Coppola, Auto-Loan Delinquencies Are the Highest Since
2012, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news
/articles/2019-02- 12/auto-loan-performance-worsens-on-rise-in-subprimedelinquencies.
21. Id.
22. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., supra note 14.
23. Id. at 6.
24. See Wolf Richter, Auto Loan Delinquency Rates Are Worse Now Than
During the Financial Crisis, Bus. INSIDER (Apr. 9, 2018 5:16 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/auto-loan-delinquency-rates-worse-now-thanduring-the-financial-crisis-2018-4.
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percent of the cars" that it lends against. 2 5 Once subprime lenders
repossess cars, the lenders increasingly sue borrowers for the loan's
balance because the cars are typically worth less than the loan
amount outstanding. 26 These suits can result in the garnishment of
people's wages for years after they no longer own the repossessed
cars.27

"Superprime" and prime borrowers are also increasingly
defaulting on their auto loans. 2 8 These defaults may stem, in part,
from lengthening repayment terms for auto loans. The "average newcar loan term is 68.8 months," as compared to 48 months in 2012.29
Longer loan terms increase the chances that households will default,
which in turn increases the likelihood of repossessions. 30 In 2017, 1.7
million motor vehicles were expected to be repossessed. 31
The changes in the auto loan market over the past decade have
led to concerns about the racial and ethnic demographics of loan
origination and repossession, 32 as well as the general stability of the

25. See Ryan Felton, This Subprime Auto Lender Repos 35 Percent of the
Cars It Finances, JALOPNIK (Feb. 9, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://jalopnik.com
/this-subprime-auto-lender-repos-35-percent-of-the-cars- 1822875696.
26. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, The Car Was
Repossessed, but the Debt Remains, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/business/dealbook/car-loan-subprime.html.
27. See id.
28. See Kelly Kent, Auto Loan Delinquencies Extending Beyond Subprime
Consumers, EXPERIAN (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.experian.com/blogs/insights
/2017/02/auto-loan-delinquencies-extending-beyond-subprime-consumers/.
29. Jeff Gitlen, Auto Loans Outstanding Hits Record in the United States,
LENDEDU (Oct. 11, 2017), https://lendedu.com/blog/outstanding-auto-loans
-market-hits-record.
30. Cf id. (noting that loans with longer terms increase the likelihood of
delinquency).
31. See Nick Zulovich, Forecast Has 2017 Repo Total Approaching 1.8M,
AUTO REMARKETING (Feb. 21, 2017, 4:24 PM), https://www.autoremarketing.com
/financial-services/forecast-has -2017-repo-total-approaching- 1 -point-8-million.
32. See, e.g., Alexander W. Butler et al., Discrimination in the Auto Loan
Market
(Dec.
12,
2019)
(unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3301009; Delvin Davis, Non-Negotiable: Negotiation Doesn't Help
African Americans and Latinos on Dealer-Financed Car Loans (Jan. 23, 2014)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract id=2386005; Racial Disparities
in Auto Loan Markups: State-by-State Data, NATL CONSUMER L. CTR. (June
2015),
https://www.ncle.org/images/pdf/car sales/ib-auto-dealers -racial
disparites.pdf; Lisa Rice & Erich Schwartz Jr., DiscriminationWhen Buying a
Car:How the Color of Your Skin Can Affect Your Car-ShoppingExperience, NAT'L
FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE (Jan. 2018), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/Discrimination-When-Buying-a-Car-FINAL-1-11-

-

2018.pdf; John W. Van Alst, Time to Stop Racing Cars: The Role of Race and
Ethnicity in Buying and Using a Car, NAT'L CONSUMER L. CTR. (Apr. 2019),
https://www.ncle.org/images/pdf/car sales/report-time-to-stop-racing-cars
april2019.pdf.
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marketplace. 33 The recent expansion of the auto loan market
spawned ominous forecasts that auto lending might be the next
housing bubble. 34 In addition, though changes in the auto loan
marketplace have only recently drawn media attention, issues with
auto title loans have plagued American households for some time. 35
Owning an automobile is a necessary part of most Americans'
lives, and for as long as it has been, many people have taken on debt
to finance that ownership. Like all debt, some of this debt will go
unpaid and creditors will initiate collection efforts. As we have
established in a prior article based on CBP data, creditors' collection
efforts push some people to file bankruptcy. 36
Not only will
households enter bankruptcy with automobiles but auto loans and
maintaining possession of cars may also be significant contributors to
their filings. 37 Yet as reviewed in Part II, there is a noticeable and

33. See, e.g., Daniel Alpert & Robert Hockett, The Debt Goes On: A PostCrisis "Progress"Report (Cornell Law Sch., Research Paper No. 16-36, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2837929; Delvin Davis & Joshua M. Frank, Under the
Hood: Auto Loan Interest Rate Hikes Inflate Consumer Costs and Loan Losses,
(Apr.
19,
2011)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1860188; Zhengfeng Guo et
al., Risks of Long-Term Auto Loans (June 12, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3290841.
34. See,
e.g.,
Is a
Subprime Auto
Loan
Crisis Brewing?,
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON

(Feb. 18, 2019), https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu

/article/auto-loan-subprime-crisis/; Steven Pearlstein, The Shadow Banks Are
Back With Another Big Bad CreditBubble, WASH. POST (May 31, 2019, 1:57 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/the-shadow-banks-areback-with-another-big-bad-credit-bubble/2019/05/31/a05184de-817a-11e9-95a9e2c830afe24f story.html (linking auto loans with the growing "shadow" banking
system); Angie Schmitt, Is Subprime Auto Lending the Next Housing Bubble?,
STREETSBLOG (Feb. 13, 2019), https://usa.streetsblog.org/2019/02/13/americascar-centric-transportation-policies-are-driving-us-to-ruin/.
35. See, e.g., JEAN ANN Fox & ELIZABETH GUY, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM.,
DRIVEN INTO DEBT: CFA CAR TITLE LOAN STORE AND ONLINE SURVEY 2-3 (2005),

https://www.texasfairlending.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2005-ConsumerFederation-of-America. -Car Title LoanReport_111705.pdf (overviewing the
survey's findings); James P. Nehf, Secured Consumer Credit and the Fringe
Banking Industry,

in

1C

SECURED

TRANSACTIONS

UNDER

THE UNIFORM

COMMERCIAL CODE § 20A.01 (James P. Nehf ed., 2019); Kathryn Fritzdixon et al.,
Dude, Where's My Car Title?: The Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending
Market, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1013, 1038-49 (2014); Jim Hawkins, Credit on
Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto-Title Lending, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
535, 538 (2012) (noting concerns); Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand
Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and DemographicRealities in Title Lending, 77
Mo. L. REV. 41, 47-49 (2012) (overviewing title loans); Katrina Pascual, 1 in 5
Auto Title Loans End in Car Repossession: CFPB Study, TECH TIMES (May 18,
2016, 7:45 AM), https://www.techtimes.com/articles/159308/20160518/1-in-5auto-title-loans-end-in-car-repossession-cfpb-study.htm.
36. Pamela Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 219,
246 (2018).
37. See infra Table 1.
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significant hole in the literature about consumer bankruptcy dealing
with cars and auto loans as a component of filings.
This Article then turns to our data.
Part III overviews
bankruptcy and related laws pertaining to automobiles. Part IV
briefly discusses methodology, and Part V presents the results of our
data analysis. In short, our results show that people in bankruptcy
own cars of modest value and owe immodest sums against those
cars. 38 Bankruptcy appears to be an important tool for some people
to keep their cars, although it is impossible to put a precise number
on the percentage of people who use bankruptcy primarily to save
their cars. We also use a cluster analysis to pinpoint distinct groups
of bankruptcy filers who own cars and to identify differences in how
people with cars use bankruptcy. 39 This analysis identifies two
groups of debtors-collectively about a third of all filers-who come
to bankruptcy owning automobiles and little else. These cases are the
most likely to be filed by people "driven to bankruptcy."
Part VI discusses what our results show about how people use
consumer bankruptcy, where the system appears to falter, and how
to remedy the identified problems. Finally, Part VII concludes with
what our results suggest about the future of the auto market's impact
on consumer bankruptcy filings.
II. CAR OWNERSHIP, FINANCIAL DISTRESS, AND BANKRUPTCY
There is scant literature directly addressing what happens to
people who file bankruptcy with a motor vehicle. The most directly
applicable work to our analysis is a twenty-year-old study by
Professors Marianne Culhane and Michaela White. Culhane and
White created a random sample of about 1000 chapter 7 cases filed in
1995 in seven federal judicial districts to focus on reaffirmation of
auto and other consumer loans through bankruptcy. 40 In their
sample, 83 percent of debtors entered bankruptcy with cars, about
half of the cars in the cases were subject to a secured loan, and debtors
intended to reaffirm the loans on 72 percent of the cars they listed on
the Statement of Intention form. 4 1

38. See infra Subpart V.A. for examples of the types and ages of cars owned
by the median debtor.
39. This cluster analysis is designed to highlight differences among debtors
that otherwise may not become apparent. See infra Subpart V.D.
40. Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Debt After Discharge:An
Empirical Study of Reaffirmation, 73 Am. BANKR. L.J. 709, 709 (1999).
"Reaffirmation" means to enter into an agreement by which the debtor continues
to pay the secured loan to the current creditor post-bankruptcy, essentially
waiving the discharge as to that debt. For a detailed discussion of reaffirmation,
see infra Subpart III.B.
41. Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 738-39. In this study, 537 cars were
listed by debtors on the Statement of Intention. The authors excluded cars that
were not listed on the Statement of Intention from their analysis. Id.; see also
infra Subpart III.B (discussing the Statement of Intention).
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Culhane and White also found that only one-third of debtors who
stated they intended to reaffirm actually filed a reaffirmation
agreement. 42 Instead, most debtors with auto loans seemingly opted
either to "ride-through" these loans, an option that the enactment of
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 ("BAPCPA") 43 ostensibly eliminated, 44 or to sign legally
unenforceable "rogue" reaffirmation agreements, 4 5 another practice
that BAPCPA intended to eliminate. 46 Because the study focused on
reaffirmation agreements, which include consumer debts besides
automobile loans, the authors did not report data about the number
of cars bankruptcy debtors owned, the value of those cars, or the
amount of auto loans outstanding.
Otherwise, most articles concerning cars and bankruptcy focus
on doctrinal questions about dealing with cars within bankruptcy's
legal constraints. 47 Prior to BAPCPA's enactment, Professor David
Gray Carlson set forth an argument about the standard bankruptcy
judges should use to value cars in chapter 13 (one of the two
bankruptcy chapters most people file). 4 8 Likewise, after the Supreme
Court published Associated Commercial Corp. v. Rash,49 which

addressed asset valuation in chapter 13, Professor Jean Braucher
addressed the decision's implications with specific attention to cars.50
Similarly, pre-BAPCPA, a handful of articles discussed the

&

42. Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 721.
43. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered
titles of the U.S. Code). The law's effective date was October 17, 2005. Id. §
1406(a), 119 Stat. at 215.
44. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
45. Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 741.
46. See id. at 717-18 (discussing "rogue" reaffirmation agreements); David
B. Wheeler & Douglas E. Wedge, A Fully-Informed Decision: Reaffirmation,
Disclosureand the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005, 79 Avi. BANKR. L.J. 789, 789 (2005). Culhane & White, supra note 40, also
found that debtors who entered into agreements with their lenders reaffirmed an
average of $7,607 and a median of $7,265 in principal (about $12,900 and $12,300
in today's dollars, respectively). Inflation is per the Bureau of Labor Statistics'
CPI Inflation Calculator, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicale.pl. See Culhane
White, supra note 40, at 755 tbl 13. Because so few debtors in the sample
reaffirmed their car loans, these figures reveal little about how much debtors'
cars were worth or how much equity the debtors held in the cars when they filed
bankruptcy. In addition, compared to our data, see Subpart V.A, these figures
for the auto loans seems very high. We suspect that many of the reaffirmed loans
included amounts loaned for other consumer goods. Indeed, the authors of the
study state that, overall, most reaffirmation agreements in their sample dealt
with non-car "big ticket" consumer items. Culhane & White, supra note 40, at
713.
47. See, e.g., Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 719.

48. See David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standards in Chapter 13
Bankruptcy Cases, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 1 (1996).
49.

520 U.S. 953 (1997).

50.

See Jean Braucher, Getting It for You Wholesale: Making Sense of

Bankruptcy Valuation of Collateral After Rash, 102 DICK. L. REV. 763, 766 (1998).
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Bankruptcy Code's provisions for the retention of cars in chapter 7
(the other chapter most people file). 5 1
Following BAPCPA's enactment, Professor William Whitford
detailed how automobile lenders benefited from its new provisions
affecting cars, including valuation, redemption, and reaffirmation
agreements. 52 Also post-BAPCPA, Professors David Gray Carlson
and Jean Braucher both discussed Bankruptcy Code provisions
affecting cars (and homes) in chapter 13.53 In addition, two papers
focused on whether BAPCPA's provisions favoring auto lenders
affected auto loans outside bankruptcy. 54
Most recently, based on a sample of chapter 13 cases filed in Cook
County, Illinois, Professors Edward Morrison and Antoine Uettwiller
found that between one-third and one-half of the debtors used chapter
13 to combat license suspensions or to save their cars from seizure
because of accumulated parking tickets and other fines. 5 5 Their
article contrasts with most other literature about the legal and
financial benefits of chapter 13, which casts filing chapter 13 as a way

51. See, e.g., Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, But Can She Keep
the Car? Some Thoughts on CollateralRetention in Consumer Chapter 7 Cases,
7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 471 (2002); Scott B. Ehrlich, The Fourth Option of
Section 521(2)(A) Reaffirmation Agreements and the Chapter 7 Consumer
Debtor, 53 MERCER L. REV. 613, 673 (2002); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael

G. Hillinger, Section 365 in the Consumer Context: Something Old, Something
New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue, 104 COM. L.J. 377, 377 (1999); see
also infra Subpart III.A (discussing chapter 7 and chapter 13).

52.

See William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions

of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143 passim (2007). See generally Lisa A. Napoli,

Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259 (2007)
(detailing BAPCPAs changes to reaffirmation agreements and focusing multiple
examples on cars); Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 55-58 (2007) (noting reaffirmation,
redemption, and ride-through as major changes brought by BAPCPA).

53. See Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-through Redux: The Terms for
Holding on to Cars, Homes and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 459 (2005) (discussing the effect of filing chapter 7 on

an individual's ability to retain personal property); David Gray Carlson, Cars and

Homes in Chapter13 After the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 14 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 301, 302 (2006) (discussing BAPCPAs benefits to auto and

home lenders).
54. See Rajashri Chakrabarti & Nathaniel Pattison, Auto Credit and the
2005Bankruptcy Reform: The Impact of EliminatingCramdowns, 32 REV. OF FIN.
STUD. 4734 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhzO39 (finding strong evidence
that BAPCPAs elimination of cramdowns decreased car loan interest rates and
some evidence of increased subprime loan sizes); Chunlin Leonhard, Negative

Externalitiesand Subprime Auto Financing:Time to Let the HangingParagraph
Go, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 267, 267-69 (2014) (discussing the hanging paragraphs'
potential impact on car loan markets).
55. See Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy
Pathologies, 173 J. INSTITUTIONAL &THEORETICAL ECON. 174, 175-76 (2017).
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for debtors to save their homes. 56 In their study, African American

debtors were more likely to file chapter 13 than other debtors,
comporting with recent research from ProPublica regarding racial
disparities in bankruptcy filings. 5 7 That study focused on filings in

the Western District of Tennessee and the Northern District of
Illinois to find that debtors filed chapter 13, in part, to reclaim
suspended licenses or to free impounded cars. 5 8

Finally, a few other works situate spending on cars as one of a
handful of consumption choices that contribute to consumer
bankruptcy filings or to households' need for credit.5 9 For example, a
recent study assessed bankruptcy filings following natural disasters
and found that filings among subprime car loan borrowers increased
twice as much in states with strong creditors' rights compared to

&

56. See Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless, Katherine Porter & Deborah
Thorne, "No Money Down" Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1062 (2017)
("Because of the ability to retain property, chapter 13 is popular with people who
want to save their homes from foreclosure.").
57. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, Data Analysis: Bankruptcy and Race in
America, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics
/bankruptcy-data-analysis. These studies also align with our research about
racial disparities in chapter choice. See generally Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen
Robert M. Lawless, Race, Attorney Influence and Bankruptcy Chapter Choice, 9
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 393 (2012) (finding evidence of steering based on race
by attorneys when advising clients of bankruptcy options); Foohey et al., supra
note 56 (detailing the role of where someone lives and someone's race on people's
likelihood of filing chapter 7 or 13).
58. Kiel & Fresques, supra note 57; see also William E. Crozier & Brandon
L. Garrett, Driven to Failure: An Empirical Analysis of Driver's License
Suspension in North Carolina (Nov. 22, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3440832 (noting that forty-one states currently require
suspension of driver's licenses for non-driving related reasons, such as not
appearing in court). The mayor of Chicago has announced she supports an end
to the city's aggressive program of impounding automobiles over unpaid parking
tickets and also supports state-level legislation to stop driver's license
suspensions for unpaid parking tickets. In her announcement, the mayor
indicated the moves were intended, among other things, to decrease bankruptcy
filings over unpaid parking tickets. Elliott Ramos & Melissa Sanchez, Mayor
Lightfoot Announces Her Plan to Stop Suspending Licenses for Parking Tickets,
NPR (July 24, 2019), https://www.npr.org/local/309/2019/07/24/744595562/mayor
-lightfoot-announces-her-plan-to-stop -suspending-licenses-for-parking-tickets.
59. See, e.g., Scott Fay et al., The Household Bankruptcy Decision, 92 AM.
ECON. REV. 706, 708-09 (2002) (including state exemptions for cars in assessing
when households will file bankruptcy); Song Han & Geng Li, Household
BorrowingAfter PersonalBankruptcy, 43 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 491, 491
(2011) (discussing households' access to consumer credit, including car loans,
after bankruptcy); Igor Livshits et al., Accounting for the Rise in Consumer
Bankruptcies, 2 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 165, 190 (2010) (finding that
changes in consumer credit markets, including non-revolving car loans, partly
accounts for rising consumer bankruptcy filing rates); Ning Zhu, Household
Consumption and PersonalBankruptcy, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (2011) (identifying
car loans as a contributor to households' need to file bankruptcy).
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states with stronger borrower protections.6 0 The study further
showed that a car repossession increased the likelihood of an
individual filing bankruptcy. 6 1
The assumption that cars are an important part of the consumer
bankruptcy system unites all of this prior literature. But, as far as
we can assess, no literature reports data specific to debtors' cars in
bankruptcy.62
In this Article, we ask whether debtors look to
bankruptcy for help with their car loans and what happens when they
do.
Before presenting the data, we first briefly review how
bankruptcy law applies to car loans.

III. THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF CARS
A complete explanation of how bankruptcy law interacts with car
ownership and car loans would take hundreds of pages.63 One of us
is the co-author of a textbook that covers the topic (along with other
types of secured lending). 64 Nevertheless, a basic knowledge of how
the Bankruptcy Code treats cars is important to understanding this
Article's findings. Readers already familiar with United States
bankruptcy law may want to skip to the next Part.

60. See Elizabeth A. Berger et al., Credit Where Credit Is Due: Drivers of
Subprime Credit (June 25, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2989380.

61.

See id.

62. Prior empirical studies of the people who file bankruptcy, including
articles based on CBP data, do not report specific data regarding cars or car loans.

See, e.g., Sara S. Greene et al., Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1036-37 (2017)
(relying on 2007 CBP data to predict how a chapter 13 filing will end); Dali6

Jim6nez, The Distributionof Assets in Consumer Chapter 7Bankruptcy Cases, 83
AM. BANKR. L.J. 795, 808 (2009) (detailing assets sold by chapter 7 trustees and
batching sales of cars with sales of stocks, insurance policies, and other personal
property); Robert M. Lawless, Angela K. Littwin, Katherine M. Porter, John A.
E. Pottow, Deborah K. Thorne, & Elizabeth Warren, Did Bankruptcy Reform
Fail? An EmpiricalStudy of ConsumerDebtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 349-50
(2008) (relying on 2007 CBP data to report key financial characteristics, such as
mortgage debt, of households that filed bankruptcy); Jean M. Lown & Barbara R.
Rowe, A Profile of Utah Consumer Bankruptcy Petitioners, 5 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
113, 113 (2003) (reporting on a sample of 2,567 chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases
filed in Utah in 1997); Scott F. Norberg, ConsumerBankruptcy'sNew Clothes: An

Empirical Study of Discharge and Debt Collection in Chapter 13, 7 AM.

BANKR.

INST. L. REV. 415, 427 (1999) (reporting on a sample of seventy-one chapter 13
cases filed in the Southern District of Mississippi between 1992 and 1998).
63. For a thorough explanation of the problematic interdependence between
the car sales and car lending industry, see Adam J. Levitin, The Fast and the

Usurious:Putting the Brakes on Auto Lending Abuses, 108 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
2020).
64.

LYNN M. LOPUCKI, ELIZABETH WARREN & ROBERT M. LAWLESS, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (8th ed. 2015).
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Bankruptcy Estate & Exemptions

A car is an asset of a bankruptcy debtor and becomes part of the
debtor's bankruptcy estate. 65 People who file bankruptcy have two
options: file chapter 7 or file chapter 13.66 In a chapter 7 bankruptcy,
the trustee can sell the debtor's nonexempt assets in the bankruptcy
estate and distribute the proceeds to unsecured creditors. 67 The
chapter 7 rules regarding asset sales and payment to creditors also
are important in a chapter 13 bankruptcy because the chapter 13
repayment plan must pay creditors at least as much as they would
have received if the debtor had filed chapter 7.68
Debtors can exempt assets from their bankruptcy estates. 69
Trustees cannot sell exempt assets. Rather, debtors keep these assets
for their post-bankruptcy lives. 7 0 In nineteen states, debtors can
choose between the federal exemptions in the Bankruptcy Code or in
state law. The other thirty-one states have exercised their right to
opt out of the federal exemptions and require bankruptcy debtors in
their state to apply their state's own exemptions. 71
The federal exemption currently stands at $4000 for one car.72
State exemptions in motor vehicles vary. For example, Idaho allows
$7000.73 Illinois allows $2400, and Indiana has no motor vehicle
exemption. 74 In addition to the motor vehicle exemption, the federal
exemptions and many state exemptions allow a "wild card" exemption
that the debtor can use to exempt any personal property the debtor
chooses. 7 5 Indiana, for example, has an $8000 wild-card exemption

65.

See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2018).

66. Although people also may file under chapter 11, very few do so because
it is expensive and cumbersome. See Foohey et al., supra note 36, at 226 n.32.
The discussion thus focuses on chapters 7 and 13.

67.

See Pamela Foohey, A New Deal for Debtors: Providing Procedural

Justice in Consumer Bankruptcy, 60 B.C. L. REv. 2297, 2338 (2019) (discussing
the trustee's role). In chapters 7 and 13, the bankruptcy trustee is a private
attorney charged with overseeing the bankruptcy case. Id.
Bankruptcy lawyers often refer to this
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4).
requirement as the "best interests of creditors" test.
69. Foohey, supra note 67, at 2306.
70. Id.
71. See AM. BANKR. INST., FINAL REPORT OF THE ABI COMMISSION ON
CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY
42 (2019),
https://consumercommission.abi.org
/commission-report.
72. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2). This figure, along with other dollar amounts
in the Code, adjusts every three years. Id. § 104(a). The last adjustment took
effect on April 1, 2019.
See Revision of Certain Dollar Amounts in the
Bankruptcy Code Prescribed Under Section 104(a) of the Code, 84 Fed. Reg. 3,488
(Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/02/12/20190 1903/revision-of-certain-dollar-amounts-in-the-bankruptcy-code-prescribedunder-section- 104a-of-the-code.
73. IDAHO CODE § 11-605(3) (2019).
74. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1001(c) (2019).

75.

See Gary E. Sullivan, A Fresh Start to Bankruptcy Exemptions, 2018

BYU L. REV. 335, 338 n.6, 390.
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the debtor could use to protect a motor vehicle. 76 The federal wildcard exemption can be as high as $13,900 depending on whether the
debtor claims a homestead exemption.7 7 Married debtors can often
combine exemptions, including federal exemptions. 78
The exemption protects the debtor's equity in the car. For
example, suppose an Indiana debtor owns a car worth $19,000 subject
to a $5000 lien. The trustee would sell the car for $19,000 (ignoring
the costs of the sale), pay off the $5000 lien, give $10,250 to the debtor
for Indiana's wild-card exemption (assuming the debtor used it to
protect the car), and distribute the remaining $3750 to creditors.
If the car was instead subject to a $10,000 lien, or if the case
involved married debtors, the trustee would not sell the car because
the exemptions would exceed the value of the debtor's equity in the
car. Rather, the debtor would keep the car. As we discuss next, if the
debtor had an outstanding loan secured by the car, the debtor would
need to take other steps to address this loan.
B.

Paying a Secured Claim

Many cars are subject to liens. These liens are often the purchase
money loan the debtor used to buy the car, but they can also be later
loans, such as a title or pawn loan secured by the car.7 9 Cars can also

become subject to involuntary liens, such as an artisan's lien for
repairs to the car or for parking or traffic fines. 8 0

Bankruptcy law discharges the debtor's personal liability on a
loan, but it does not extinguish the lien. 8 1 Thus, even after
bankruptcy, if a debtor wishes to keep a car, the debtor must continue
paying the car loan, or the creditor can repossess the automobile. 82
The debtor can also avoid some involuntary liens in bankruptcy. 8 3

76.
77.

See IND. CODE § 34-55-10-2(c)(2) (2019).
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5). The dollar amounts were adjusted effective

April 1, 2019 to $1325 and $12,575 for an aggregate of $13,900. See supra note
72 and accompanying text.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(m); In re Miller, 167 BR. 782, 782-83 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1994) (married debtors may combine motor vehicle exemption to protect
equity in a car); see also In re Sherman, 237 BR. 551, 553-55 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1999) (married debtors could combine exemptions to protect other personal
property).
79. This lien is referred to as a "purchase-money security interest." A
"purchase-money security interest" is one that secures a loan for the purchase
price of the car. The typical loan obtained from an auto dealer or at a bank to
purchase a car would give rise to a "purchase-money security interest."
80. See LOPUCKI ET AL., supra note 64.
81. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1328 (2018).
82. In some instances, while a bankruptcy case is pending, the trustee will
abandon the vehicle, removing it from the bankruptcy estate, allowing the
creditor to repossess it as allowed under applicable law. See id. § 554.
83. Id. § 545 (avoiding many statutory liens). Judicial liens that impair an
exemption can be avoided under id. § 522(f).
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A chapter 7

consumer debtor with a secured claim against a car has three choices.
First, the debtor can surrender the car to the creditor and face no
post-bankruptcy liability on the car because of the bankruptcy
discharge. Second, the debtor can redeem the car by paying the entire
value of the car to the creditor (instead of the amount of the loan).8 5
Third, the debtor can reaffirm the debt. 86 Reaffirmation allows a
debtor to assume post-bankruptcy liability on a debt that otherwise
would be discharged, essentially waiving the discharge as to the debt.
This means that the loan continues to exist outside the bankruptcy
proceeding.8 7 The Bankruptcy Code imposes procedural safeguards
before a debtor can reaffirm a debt that requires either the lawyer's
or the court's acquiescence that reaffirmation is in the debtor's best
interest.8 8
The Bankruptcy Code requires a debtor who files chapter 7 to
submit a Statement of Intention within thirty or forty-five days of the
meeting of creditors. 8 9 The Statement of Intention must specify
whether the debtor intends to surrender, redeem, or reaffirm the debt
on the car.9 0 If the debtor fails to meet the deadline, the car ceases to
have the protections of bankruptcy law, and the creditor can proceed
with its state-law remedies against the car (i.e., repossession and
sale).9 1
The law on the ground about the Statement of Intention diverges
substantially from the law on the books. Many debtors do not file a
Statement of Intention, or they choose a supposedly prohibited fourth
choice, to retain the automobile. 92 This procedure is often referred to
as a ride-through, because the car loan simply continues after
bankruptcy. 9 3 Creditors are often willing to accept a ride-through so
long as the debtor remains current on the car loan because, after all,
if the debtor misses car payments, the creditor can still repossess the
car. 94 The law on the books clearly gives a creditor rights in the
84. Richard B. Hagedorn, The Survival and Enforcement of the Secured
Claim Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (1980).
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 722 (allowing the redemption of "tangible personal
property intended primarily for personal, family, or household use" by paying the
"secured claim"). Under id. § 506(a)(1), the "secured claim" equals the value of
the collateral.
86. See id. § 524.
87. See id.
88. See id. § 524(c).
89. As explained at AM. BANKR. INST., supra note 71, at 52-57, Congress
enacted conflicting 30- and 45-day requirements in § 521 as part of BAPCPA and
has not fixed the conflict in the fourteen years that have passed since.
90. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2018).
91. See id. § 362(h).
92. See ELIZABETH WARREN ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:
TEXT, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 191-92 (7th ed. 2014) (discussing ride-through).
93. Id.
94. Id.

302

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

absence of a Statement of Intention, but insisting on these rights in
bankruptcy court is often not cost-justified given the dollar figures
involved.9 5 The typical creditor will have recourse to the car or its
value regardless of whether the creditor insists on its rights, and an
aggressive legal strategy generally will not materially increase the
recovery from a debtor who has filed bankruptcy. 96
A chapter 13 bankruptcy requires the debtor's repayment to
creditors over a three- or five-year repayment plan.9 7 Chapter 13
debtors can use the car during the pendency of the bankruptcy case. 98
Generally speaking, debtors above their state's median income must
use a five-year plan. 9
For secured claims, unless the creditor consents to a different
treatment, the debtor must either surrender the collateral or make
payments equal to the present value of the secured claim-that is, the
debtor must make payments with interest.1 00 If the debtor has
missed payments and is in arrears, chapter 13 can be an especially
useful tool. The debtor can spread repayment of the arrearage over
the three- or five-year life of the plan instead of paying it all at once,
as they would need to do outside of bankruptcy. 101
The "secured claim" that the debtor must pay is usually the value
of the collateral. 102 As part of BAPCPA, Congress enacted special
protections for any purchase-money security interest in an
automobile purchased within 910 days (i.e., two and a half years)
before the bankruptcy filing. 103 The provision is known as the
"hanging paragraph" because, in another example of the illconsidered nature of BAPCPA, Congress put the provision in an
unnumbered paragraph of section 1325.104 If the hanging paragraph
applies, the chapter 13 plan must pay the full amount of the debt, not

95. See, e.g., Dumont v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dumont), 581 F.3d 1104,
1118 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that BAPCPA eliminated ride-through); In re
Miller, 443 BR. 54, 58-59 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (same); In re Linderman, 435
BR. 715, 718 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) ("Nationally, debtors no longer can keep
personal property without reaffirming the debt or redeeming the property.").
96. See Ehrlich, supra note 51, at 617 (discussing ride-through prior to
BAPCPA); Amber J. Moren, Note, Debtor's Dilemma: The Economic Case for
Ride-Through in the Bankruptcy Code, 122 YALE L.J. 1594, 1596 (2013)
(discussing ride-through after BAPCPA).
97. For a discussion of chapter 13, see Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 106263.
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2018) (giving a chapter 13 debtor the powers of a
bankruptcy trustee under section 363, which includes the right to use property of
the bankruptcy estate).
99. See id. § 1322(d).
100. See id. § 1325(a)(5).
101. See id. § 1322(b)(5).
102. See id. § 506(a).
103. See id. § 1325(a)(*); supra note 79 (defining "purchase-money security
interest").
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*).
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just the value of the collateral.10 5 The hanging paragraph is not
applicable to car loans that are more than two and a half years old,
but loans that are two and a half years old may have amortized to a
point where the amount owed is roughly equivalent or even lower
than the value of the car anyway. 106
C.

CombattingRepossessions and License Suspensions

In addition to addressing secured claims against cars, filing
bankruptcy is useful to combat repossessions. Bankruptcy comes
with the automatic stay, which prohibits any act to collect on
prepetition claims, such as auto loans. 107 Courts have generally, but
not universally, held that the automatic stay requires the return of
repossessed (but not yet sold) cars to debtors in chapter 13.108
Chapter 7 likewise can assist debtors in getting their repossessed cars
back, provided they reaffirm or redeem the accompanying debt. 109
Finally, unpaid parking tickets and other government-assessed
fees and fines also can lead to cars being booted or impounded, a
practice for which Chicago has received national press.110 Beyond
105. See Juliet M. Moringiello, (Mis)use of State Law in Bankruptcy: The
Hanging ParagraphStory, 2012 Wis. L. REV. 963, 970 (2012).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(*).
107. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6).
108. See Eugene R. Wedoff, Return of Vehicles Seized Before a Chapter 13
Filing:Does the Debtor Have to File a Turnover Motion?, 2019 Am. BANKR. INST.
J. 2, 2 (discussing "the right of a chapter 13 debtor to obtain the return of a vehicle
seized before the bankruptcy was filed" and the circuit split regarding when a
secured creditor must turn over a repossessed vehicle to the debtor). Compare In
re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that once a debtor files
bankruptcy, a city (here, Chicago) cannot "continue to hold a debtor's vehicle until
the debtor pays her outstanding parking tickets"), and Weber v. SEFCU (In re
Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a secured creditor violated
the automatic stay when it did not return a repossessed vehicle to a chapter 13
debtor), and Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 700 (7th
Cir. 2009) (holding that a secured creditor must immediately return a vehicle it
lawfully repossessed pre-petition upon the debtor filing chapter 13), with In re
Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a secured creditor
does not need to turn over a vehicle repossessed pre-petition immediately), and
WD Equip. v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding
that a secured creditor only must return a vehicle to a chapter 13 debtor if the
court grants the debtor's motion for turnover).
109. See supra Subpart III.B.

110. See Will Racke, Report: Chicago Has Seized and Sold Nearly 50,000 Cars
over Ticket Debt Since 2011, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 7, 2019, 9:14 PM),
https://www.newsweek.com/chicago-seize-cars-tickets-1283106;

Melissa Sanchez

& Sandhya Kambhampati, How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into
Bankruptcy, PROPUBLICA ILL. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org
/driven-into-debt/chicago-ticket-debt-bankruptcy/;
see also David Siegel,

Bankruptcy Is the Answer to Recovering an Impounded Car: But Be Patient, LAW
OFF. DAVID M. SIEGEL (May 27, 2015), https://davidmsiegel.com/bankruptcy-isthe-answer-to-recovering-an-impounded-auto-but-be-patient/

(linking

impounding and filing chapter 13 bankruptcy with unpaid parking tickets). In
some cities, leaving a car on a street for too long can result in towing. See Laura
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releasing vehicles from the impound lot, chapter 13's broader
discharge gets rid of some fees and fines such as parking tickets,
which in turn helps debtors with license suspensions.111 In contrast,
chapter 7 does not include such a broad discharge, a difference which
recent research has linked to some people filing chapter 13 to deal
with parking tickets and license suspensions. 112
IV. METHODOLOGY

The data in this Article are from the CBP, a long-running study
of the people who file bankruptcy in the United States. The CBP
began in 1981 and also studied waves of bankruptcy filers in 1991,
1999, 2001, and 2007.113 In 2013, the CBP started continuous data
collection. 114 The authors of this Article now serve as the co-principal
investigators ("co-PIs") for the CBP. 115
This Article uses data collected by the CBP from 2013-2018,
hereafter referred to as the "current CBP." Previous iterations of the
CBP did not collect detailed information about debtor's motor
vehicles. 116

In the current CBP, a national random sample of 200 bankruptcy
cases (chapter 7 and chapter 13) is drawn every three months.1 17
Court records are publicly and electronically available. The court
records for each filer in the sample are downloaded and coded into a
database by law students supervised by one of the co-PIs. One or
more of the co-PIs double-checks the court-record coding using a
computer program to identify potentially problematic data entries. 1 18

J. Nelson, Towing a Car Can Be FinanciallyRuinous. Should California Cities
Do It Anyway?, L.A. TIMES (June 12, 2019, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com

/local/1anow/la-me-In-los-angeles-unpaid-parking-tickets-towing-impound20190612-story.html (noting that some California cities will tow vehicles left on
the street for more than 72 hours and that Los Angeles "charges $133 for the tow,
$115 to release the vehicle, and a $45.65 fee for each day the car is in storage");

see also supra note 58.
111. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 727(b), with id. § 1328(a)(3). See generally Pamela
Foohey, Fines, Fees, and Filing Bankruptcy, 97 N.C. L. REV. 419 (2020)
(discussing the scope of the chapter 7 and chapter 13 discharge as regards civil
fines and fees).
112. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.

113. Melissa B. Jacoby et al., Rethinking the Debates over Health Care
Financing:Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 376-77
(2001); Lawless et al., supra note 62, at 353-54.
114. Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1072.
115. For more about the CBP, see CONSUMER BANKR. PROJECT,
http://www.consumerbankruptcyproject.org/ (last visited May 2, 2020).

116. See Lawless et al., supra note 62, at 387-98 (detailing the history of the
CBP); see also Jacoby et al., supra note 113, at 386-91 (discussing the 1999
"Phase III" of the CBP).
117. Other discussions of the methodology for the current CBP appear at
Foohey et al., supra note 36, at 232-34; Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1071-74.
118. Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1072.
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The current CBP thus consists of the court records for 4800
households that filed bankruptcy.
Each household in the sample also receives a seven-page
questionnaire asking for demographic information as well as
information about the household's circumstances before and after the
bankruptcy filing. 119 Respondents who complete the questionnaire
receive a fifty-dollar gift card. 120 In total, 1,315 questionnaires were
returned for a response rate of 27.4 percent. The only data in this
Article that use the questionnaire responses are respondents' age,
marital status, and racial identifications. This Article uses the full
set of 4800 observations for which court records are available except
when reporting age, marital status, or race information.
As part of a bankruptcy filing, a debtor must submit schedules
disclosing debts and assets, as well as other information related to
the bankruptcy case. These schedules include listings of the debtor's
personal property and the property's value. 12 1 Automobiles, light
trucks (e.g., pickup trucks), motorcycles, and similar conveyances
used for personal transportation were coded as a "car." Trailers,
ATVs, four-wheelers, mobile homes, and commercial vehicles (e.g., a
semitrailer owned by a truck driver who had filed an individual
bankruptcy) were not considered cars. 122
The CBP records the value for the three most valuable cars as
listed in Schedule B. Only 3.2 percent of cases had more than three
cars, and less than 0.8 percent had more than four cars. For each car,
the value of all security interests and liens against the car was
recorded from Schedule D, which is the amount owing on the loan.
The bankruptcy schedules do not contain other information about the
loan terms, such as the length of the loan or the interest rate. 123 If no
security interests or liens were listed, the debtor was considered to
own the car "free and clear" (i.e., that the amount of the security
interests and liens was zero). Finally, in chapter 7 cases, the debtor's
intention as to the car was recorded from Form 8 (Statement of
Intention). (The debtor does not file a Statement of Intention in a
chapter 13 case.)
The availability of "Blue Book" values for cars makes their
valuation less problematic than the valuation of the debtor's other
personal property.
"Blue Book" valuations require accurate

119.
120.

Id. at 1071-72.
Id. at 1073.

121. Schedule A/B Property (individuals) - Form 106AIB, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual-debtors/schedule-ab-propertyindividuals (last visited May 2, 2020).
122. Id.
123. Schedule D: Creditors Who Hold Claims Secured by Property
(individuals) - Form 106D, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/forms
/individual-debtors/schedule-d-creditors-who-hold-claims-secured-propertyindividuals (last visited May 2, 2020).
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information about the car's features and condition. 124
The
bankruptcy schedules are, of course, prepared for the purpose of the
bankruptcy case. Incomplete information or litigation incentives can
affect a car's valuation in the bankruptcy schedules. 125 A "Blue Book"
generally lists two values: the value a car dealer would give to take
the car as a trade-in and the retail price a car dealer would charge for
the car. 12 6 We suspect, although do not know for certain, that many
debtors use the car's lower trade-in "Blue Book" value rather than the
higher retail value. We elaborate on how valuation may be affecting
the Article's findings below.
Throughout this Article, we generally report medians rather than
means because the presence of outliers skews the means. We do not
report tests of statistical significance for most univariate comparisons
or crosstabulations, although many of the differences are statistically
significant. Because of the large number of observations, it is easy for
a univariate or crosstabulation comparison to pass the conventional
0.05 threshold for statistical significance even for relatively small
effects. Instead of statistical significance, we urge readers to focus on
the size of the differences in the data.
V. RESULTS: FILING BANKRUPTCY WITH CARS
A.

Car Ownership and Loans (Summary Statistics)

Because chapter 7 and chapter 13 bankruptcy offer very different
types of relief for cars, 127 we first present summary statistics
separately for households that filed under each chapter. As a point of
comparison for nonbankrupt households, we look to the 2016 Survey
of Consumer Finances ("SCF"), the most recent version of the Federal
Reserve's triennial survey, to provide a financial snapshot of U.S.
households. 128
Because of different variable definitions and
methodologies, the SCF provides only a general point of
comparison. 129

124.

What's My Car Worth- Blue Book Used Car & Trade-In Values,

BLUE BOOK, https://www.kbb.com/whats-my-car-worth/

KELLEY
(last visited May 2,

2020).
125. See id. (showing a car's year, make, model, and mileage is necessary to
accurately calculate the car's value); see also infra Subpart V.A (describing
debtors' incentives to "lowball" the value of their cars).
126. What Is Blue Book Value?, KELLEY BLUE BOOK (Dec. 17, 2013, 12:53 PM),
https://www.kbb.com/what-is/blue-book-value/.
127. See supra Part III.
128. See
Survey
of
Consumer Finances, FED.
RES.
BOARD,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/sefindex.htm (last visited May 2, 2020);
see also Survey of Consumer Finances - About, FED. RES. BOARD,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/aboutsef.htm (last updated Mar. 16,
2017).
129. The tabulations from the SCF were done using the Survey
Documentation and Analysis tool available from the University of California,
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Not surprisingly, bankruptcy filers are in much worse financial
shape than the general population as captured by the SCF. The
median total debt to annual income ratio is 2.33 for bankruptcy filers
as compared to 0.49 for SCF respondents. As reported in Table 1,
levels of car ownership, however, are similar between people who file
bankruptcy and SCF respondents. Across all filers, 84.7 percent own
cars, as compared to 84.8 percent of SCF respondents. The median
bankruptcy filer has one car with the median joint bankruptcy filing
of a married couple having two cars. Both are the same as the
corresponding median SCF households.
Also as reported in Table 1, more chapter 13 filers (88.8 percent)
have cars as compared to chapter 7 filers (82.5 percent).
The
percentage of chapter 7 filers with cars, notably, is the same as in
Culhane and White's study of chapter 7 filers from 1995, which is the
only data point of comparison from prior literature. 1 30 Also similar to
the result in Culhane & White's study that about half of debtors' cars
were subject to a loan, in our study, of debtors' three most valuable
cars, 52.1 percent of the cars had a lien against them. 13 1 These
findings suggest patterns of car ownership in bankruptcy are longstanding. 1 3 2

Berkeley.
SDA: Survey Documentation and Analysis, U.C. BERKLEY,
http://sda.berkeley.edu (last visited May 2, 2020).
130. See Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 738.
131. See id.
132. We assessed the possibility that car ownership varied based on the need
for an automobile in a location through two different measures. First, we used
zip-code level data from the United States Census Bureau's American
Community Survey, which tracks how people commute to work (car alone,
carpool, and public transit). See American Community Survey, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs (last visited May 2,
2020). Second, we considered a location's rurality using data from the United
States Department of Agriculture's
Rural-Urban Continuum, which
"distinguishes metropolitan counties by the population size of their metro area,
and nonmetropolitan counties by degree of urbanization and adjacency to a metro
area", to create a 9-item categorical variable for rurality. See Rural-Urban
Continuum Codes, USDA EcoN. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/dataproducts/rural-urban-continuum-codes/ (last updated Oct. 25, 2019). Neither
measure showed a geographical disparity in debtors' vehicle ownership and
where they reside.
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TABLE 1. HOUSEHOLDS WITH CARS - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR
BANKRUPTCY FILERS BY CHAPTER AND
AS COMPARED TO THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES
Chapter 7 Chapter 13
Filers
Filers

SCF

Percentages & Counts
% car owners
% car owners with house
% cars with liens
Median # of cars owned, all households
Median # of cars owned, joint filers/married

82.5%
39.0%
45.8%
1.0
2.0

88.8%
58.5%
62.2%
1.0
2.0

84.8%
69.5%
n/a
1.0
2.0

Medians for Car Owners
Value of most valuable car
Amount owed on most valuable car
Equity in most valuable car

$5,394
$2,746
$1,029

$8,923
$9,776
$0

n/a
n/a
n/a

Total value of all cars owned
Total owned on car loans
Total equity in all cars owned

$6,473
$3,797
$1,215

$10,496
$11,062
$0

$17,100
$0
$11,900

Total car value/total assets
23.2%
13.8%
8.7%
66.2%
51.5%
67.2%
Total car value/total assets (no house)
Notes: Table 1 reports medians and percentages from the current CBP, as well
as a comparison to the SCF (using the Survey & Documentation Analysis tool
from the University of California, Berkeley). Percentages and counts are given
for all cases with medians given for persons who own cars.
The CBP and SCF follow different data conventions that are important to
note. The CBP includes as a "car" the following: "automobiles, light trucks (e.g.,
pickup trucks), motorcycles and similar conveyances used for personal
transportation," while the SCF counts motorcycles with motor homes and other
recreational vehicles. The CBP data are reported using 2018 dollars, while the
SCF data are reported using 2016 dollars. The CBP data observe the value and
equity in individual cars, while the SCF data are computed using aggregate
figures across all cars. Finally, the CBP analogue for a married couple is a joint
bankruptcy case.

Car values diverge between the two bankruptcy chapters. One
explanation might be that chapter 7 debtors want to lowball the
estimates of value, lest their schedules suggest assets are available
for distributions to creditors. A recent study found that when
exemption levels for home equity rise, chapter 7 bankruptcy filings
also increase, suggesting that asset valuation is important to
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debtors. 133 In chapter 13, debtors have less of an incentive to lowball
because they often will have to pay the full amount owing to the
lender anyway, and an inaccurately low valuation only invites
objections from the chapter 13 trustee or the car lender. 134 it is
unlikely, however, that these legal incentives can fully explain the
differences in car valuations between the chapters. Information on
the market value of automobiles is readily available through the Blue
Book pricing guides. 135 As compared to most other personal property,
debtors do not have as much latitude in listing an automobile's value.
The most valuable automobile for the median chapter 7 filer is
worth approximately $5400, which is roughly in the same price range
as the trade-in values for a typical five-year-old Ford Focus or a sixyear-old Toyota Corolla. The median chapter 13 filer's most valuable
car is worth $8928, which is closer in value to a two-year-old Ford
Focus or three-year-old Toyota Corolla. Chapter 13 filers tend to have
more income, but in an unreported regression, bankruptcy chapter
remained a statistically significant contributor to car value even after
controlling for income. Table 1 indicates that, despite having less
valuable cars, chapter 7 filers have more of their wealth concentrated
in cars than chapter 13 filers (23.2 percent versus 13.8 percent). This
effect is most likely due to the higher concentration of homeowners in
chapter 13, and indeed it reverses when looking at non-homeowners
only.
Across all debtors, chapters 7 and 13, the most valuable car is
more likely than the second most valuable car to be encumbered with
an auto loan (60.5 percent and 39.6 percent respectively). The third
most valuable car is even less likely to have a lien on it (27.2 percent).
As reported in Table 1, chapter 13 debtors also are more likely to enter
bankruptcy with liens on their cars as compared to chapter 7 debtors.
This result holds for the most valuable, second most valuable, and
third most valuable vehicles. 136
Thus, when controlling for
homeownership, chapter 13 filers not only are more likely to have a
higher percentage of their wealth concentrated in cars but they are
also more likely to have loans on those cars.
Comparing car values from the bankruptcy filers to the SCF data
must be done with caution. The SCF Codebook indicates that car
value is computed using retail values. 137 Bankruptcy filers, especially

&

133. See Nathaniel Pattison & Richard M. Hynes, Asset Exemptions and
Consumer Bankruptcies: Evidence from Individual Filings 3, 17, 31 (Va. Law
Econ., Research Paper No. 2019-14, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3413911.
134. Id. at 7-8.

135.

See What's My Car Worth, supra note 124.

136. 53.7 percent, 32.4 percent, and 21.2 percent of chapter 7 filers owe a
secured lender on their most valuable, second most valuable, and third most
valuable car (respectively), as compared to 72.3 percent, 50.4 percent, and 33.9
percent of chapter 13 filers (respectively).
137. The SCF codebook is searchable at https://www.federalreserve.gov/apps
/sefeb (last visited May 2, 2020).
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chapter 7 filers, are more likely to use the lower trade-in value. 138
Online sites that give consumers information about car values
suggest that the retail value will be 25-40 percent more than the
trade-in value. 1 39 Even with this rough adjustment, bankruptcy filers
have less valuable cars than the general population as captured by

the SCF.
Despite having less valuable cars, bankruptcy filers have more of
their wealth concentrated in them than the SCF respondents.
Persons come to bankruptcy court with their wealth depleted, and the
data bear out the intuition that people will hold onto their means of
transportation if they can. 14 0 Although people in bankruptcy own
cars at the same percentage as SCF respondents, those bankruptcy
filers with cars are less likely to own homes as compared to SCF
respondents. This finding also lends credence to the intuition that
people will hold onto their cars even after defaulting on their
mortgages and losing their homes. 141
Interestingly, when looking at non-homeowners, the SCF
respondents report a similar concentration of wealth in cars as
chapter 13 bankruptcy filers and a higher concentration of wealth in
cars than chapter 7 filers. That non-homeowners in the general
population appear to have similar patterns of wealth accumulation as
bankruptcy filers merits further study but is outside the scope of this
Article's focus on bankruptcy filers.
Where bankruptcy filers most clearly differ from SCF
respondents is in the level of car indebtedness. The median SCF
respondent reported no automobile loans and $11,900 in equity in
cars, where the median chapter 7 filer owed approximately $3800
with only $1215 of equity, and the median chapter 13 filer owed a
little over $11,060 with no equity in their cars.
Perhaps it is not surprising that debtors arrive in bankruptcy
court with cars and relatively high levels of debt (in relation to value)
securing those cars. But these findings establish that debtors look to
the bankruptcy system to help deal with car debt, while suggesting
that people hold onto their cars through financially turbulent times.
138. This practice can be seen in continuing legal education publications
aimed at practicing consumer bankruptcy attorneys. See MARK G. DEGIACOMO,
A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY § 2.4.5(b) (4th ed. 2018) (advising
attorneys to use "'book value' at wholesale" to value automobiles absent "unusual
circumstances"); Kent A. Gaertner, Bankruptcy InitialInterview: Tips and Traps,
26 J. DUPAGE COUNTY BAR AsS'N 26, 31 (2014) (noting that for car valuations, "the
less value the better").
139. Elizabeth Punke, What Is the Average Mark Up on a Used Car?,
ITSTILLRUNS,
https://itstillruns.com/average-mark-up-used-car-7326490.html
(last visited May 2, 2020).
140. Foohey et al., supra note 36, at 239, 242.
141. See Bliss, supra note 6 (quoting hedge fund manager Steve Eisman, who
noted that even during the Great Recession, auto loan delinquencies were
relatively low because people "tended to default on their house first, credit card
second and car third").
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These results also show that people enter bankruptcy with older, less
valuable vehicles, not the new or luxury automobiles that some may
assume debtors are using bankruptcy to retain or which show up in
one-off cases. 142
B. Keeping Cars and DischargingDebts (Chapter Choice and Case
Outcomes)
Although what constitutes a "successful" outcome in a
bankruptcy case is contested, car owners appear to have better case
outcomes than bankruptcy filers who do not own cars. As Table 2
shows, car owners are less likely to have their cases dismissed, both
in chapter 7 and in chapter 13.
Our data cannot explain why debtors with cars are more likely to
receive a discharge. Perhaps owning cars motivates debtors to work
hard to keep their cars, which would result in more cases that include
cars receiving a discharge. Perhaps debtors with more resources, as
evidenced by car ownership, are more likely to obtain discharge.
However, our data show that both pro se and represented debtors who
own cars are more likely to receive a discharge than debtors that
enter bankruptcy without cars. People who file pro se are generally
thought to be resource-poor as compared to other debtors. 143 In
addition, in a regression controlling for income as a proxy for having
resources, debtors who come to bankruptcy owning cars are 25
percent less likely to have their cases dismissed as debtors without
cars. Debtors with cars have more successful bankruptcy court
outcomes than those without cars.

142. See, e.g., In re Hageney, 422 B.R. 254, 261-63 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 2009)
(giving the debtors ten days to convert their case to chapter 13 before the court
would dismiss their chapter 7 case for bad faith because they had purchased a
Victory motorcycle for approximately $20,000 just ten weeks prior to filing); Bill

Balena, My Avon Lake Neighbor Declared Bankruptcy and Kept Two Cadillacs,
BALENA L. FIRM, LLC (May 5,

2013), http://ohbksource.com/my-avon-lakeneighbor-declared-bankruptcy-and-kept-two-cadillacs/.

143. See Angela Littwin, The Affordability Paradox: How Consumer
Bankruptcy's Greatest Weakness May Account for Its Surprising Success, 52 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1933, 1938 (2011) (finding that pro se debtors "had statistically
significantly lower incomes and asset levels than their represented
counterparts").
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TABLE 2. CASE OUTCOMES BY CAR OWNERSHIP
Chapter 7 Filings
Dismissed
Discharged
Pending

Owns Car

No Car

1.9%
80.8%
17.2%

6.2%
76.1%
17.7%

Chapter 13 Filings
29.9%
40.9%
Dismissed
Discharged
10.4%
8.0%
Pending
59.7%
51.1%
Notes: Table 2 reports bankruptcy case outcomes by the chapter at the time of
filing between car owners and non-car owners (N for chapter 7 = 2,939, N for
chapter 13 = 1,567). Case outcomes are updated at three different times after
the sample is pulled. Thus, the outcome is measured as of the most recent
inspection of the docket, which is within six to eight weeks of filing for one-third
of the data, more than one year for one-third of the data, and more than two
years for one-third of the data.

Another measure of case outcomes is to consider what the debtor
does with the car. As explained above, in a chapter 7 case, a debtor
must file a Statement of Intention about any assets serving as
collateral. What debtors indicate in that statement provides a more
complete picture of what they desire to happen to an automobile in
those cases. Figure 1 breaks down the intended disposition for
chapter 7 debtors' three most valuable cars.
Two-thirds of chapter 7 debtors state that they intend to reaffirm
the debt on their most valuable vehicle, and 57.8 percent have the
same intention for their second most valuable vehicle. In addition to
the reaffirmations, another approximately 20 percent of debtors
either do not list an intention or state that they intend to retain the
first- or second-most valuable car. Particularly for a household's two
most valuable vehicles, these are attempts at "ride-through," where
the debtor continues to make the car payments after bankruptcy.
Although post-BAPCPA the Bankruptcy Code does not permit ridethroughs, car lenders are often happy to continue receiving payments
on a car loan and do not contest it. The findings suggest that ridethrough is more prevalent than many lawyers might realize, even
after multiple court decisions holding that BAPCPA eliminated ridethrough as an option.
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FIGURE 1. INTENDED DISPOSITION OF CARS IN CHAPTER 7, FROM
STATEMENTS OF INTENTION

U Most Valuable

13,3%~
K 20.6%

Surrender

0 2nd Most Valuable

25.0%

O 3rd Most Valuable

1.2%
1.0%
1.9%

Redeem

66.1%
57.8%

Reaffirm

19.4%
20.6%

Retain or no intention

38.5%
0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Notes: Figure 1 reports the action expressed in the debtor's Statement of
Intention in a chapter 7 case, sorted by the relative value of automobile. (The
debtor does not file a Statement of Intention in a chapter 13 case.) N for most
valuable car is 1,263. N for second most valuable car is 302. N for third most
valuable car is 52.

Putting these figures together, chapter 7 debtors indicate that
they want to continue their auto loan after bankruptcy 85.5 percent
of the time for the most valuable car and 78.4 percent of the time for
the second most valuable car. Although this discussion has focused
on the two most valuable cars thus far, because so few debtors have
more than two cars, chapter 7 debtors also seek to continue the auto
loan 73.1 percent of the time for a third car. The higher percentage
of cases in which debtors state no intention as to their third most
valuable vehicle, however, may show that debtors are comfortable
with losing the vehicle if ride-through proves infeasible. Conversely,
the higher percentages of debtors indicating that they want to
reaffirm the loans on the first and second most valuable vehicles
suggest that debtors are particularly concerned about keeping one or
two cars. This hypothesis, of course, aligns with research about cars
being crucial to people's livelihoods. Depending on household size and
access to public transportation, debtors may need two cars to survive.
As a point of comparison, recall that in their study of chapter 7
cases filed in 1997, Culhane and White reported that 72 percent of
debtors with cars stated that they intended to reaffirm their auto
loans, although only about one-third of debtors with car loans
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ultimately filed reaffirmation agreements. 14 4 Per their methodology,
Culhane and White excluded cars that debtors did not list on the
Statement of Intention. 14 5 In our reported results, we include all cars
with loans, even if the debtor did not list an intention regarding the
loan, by collapsing these debtors with debtors who check the "retain
the property and [explain]" box on the Statement of Intention.
Although there are blank lines for the debtor to include an
explanation, few debtors write anything. Not listing an intention and
checking a box without providing explanation are equally noncompliant with the Bankruptcy Code and both seem to be attempts at
ride-throughs.
Removing from our sample cars for which the debtor listed no
intention regarding the loan, chapter 7 debtors indicate that they
plan to reaffirm the loans on 66.7 percent of their cars. This
percentage is lower than the percentage of reaffirmations reported by
Culhane and White. However, Culhane and White's study was
limited to seven districts, and research shows significant interdistrict
variation in bankruptcy outcomes. 146 When we limit our sample to
the seven districts used by Culhane & White, the intended
reaffirmation rate decreases to 62.4 percent.
It appears that
reaffirmation rates have declined since 1995, although we do not
observe whether the reaffirmation occurs.
The most likely reason for the decline in intended reaffirmations
is from BAPCPA's 2005 changes to the bankruptcy law. BAPCPA
added a requirement that the debtor act on the stated intention
within 45 days. 1 4 7 If the debtor does not act within the deadline,
bankruptcy's automatic stay is lifted and secured creditors can
proceed against their collateral. 148 Thus, after 2005 there is more of
a consequence to not following through on a stated intention to
reaffirm. Also, BAPCPA required debtor's attorneys to opine that a
debtor would be able to make payments under a reaffirmation
agreement if the debtor's expenses exceed the debtor's income. 149
Cumulatively, these changes were predicted to have a chilling effect
on reaffirmation agreements, and it appears they have.
Ultimately, however, bankruptcy law leaves debtors few options
to modify an auto loan, and debtors seem to leave bankruptcy with

144.

See Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 739-40.

145. Id. at 763, 765, 768.
146. See id. at 711-12, 721. Culhane & White also note the variability in
reaffirmation agreements and outcomes across the seven districts in their study.

147.

See 11U.S.C. § 521(a)(1), (6) (2018).

148. Id. §§ 362(h)(1), 521(a). BAPCPA also added a form reaffirmation
agreement to be used by debtors. See id. § 524(k).
149. Id. §§ 524(c), (k)(5); see also Devin L. Palmer, Reaffirmation Agreements
Under BAPCPA and Potential Liability of Bankruptcy Attorneys, DAILY REC.
(Jan. 31, 2006), https://boylancode.com/reaffirmation-agreements-under-bapepaand-potential-liability-of-bankruptcy-attorneys/ (speculating about attorneys'
willingness to sign the certification soon after BAPCPA's passage).
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the same loans with which they entered. That is, debtors want to
keep their cars, particularly the one or two they need to live
productively, and they are willing to continue paying their secured
creditors to do so. To the extent bankruptcy makes car loans more
manageable, it is because of the freeing of income from debt service
from the other discharged debts.
Another surprising finding is the paucity of redemptions. As
noted, the Bankruptcy Code allows a debtor to redeem collateral
securing a consumer debt by paying the value of the collateral.15 0 A
cottage industry of lenders specializes in providing financing to
bankruptcy debtors who want to redeem collateral. 15 1 Where the
collateral is worth less than the face amount of the debt, redemption
can be financially advantageous, although redemption loans can be
costly with high interest rates. Despite the availability of these loans,
however, redemptions are playing a very small role in helping debtors
cope with car loans.
C.

It Is Not Asset Value (Exemptions)
We hypothesize that people use bankruptcy to save their cars
primarily because of the importance of the cars as access to jobs,
schooling, and health care and not because of the economic value of
the cars.
We do not directly observe, of course, the debtor's
motivations, and in any event, these motivations are likely complex
and overlapping. Our data, however, indicate that the economic value
of the cars is not the primary motivation.
As explained above, the debtor can exempt equity in an
automobile in an amount that varies from state to state. Across all
cases, 22.4 percent of debtors claim an exemption in an automobile.
If the debtor's primary motivation was to protect the economic value
of the car, we would expect to see differences in debtors' bankruptcy
cases based on the nonexempt value the debtor would lose. Our
research protocols for the CBP did not contemplate coding
exemptions, but for purposes of this Article, we returned to the
original court files and coded the exemptions for half of the cases from
each year of the data.
The median car owner who claimed an exemption had $2932 of
equity in the claimed car that was exempt from the bankruptcy
estate. Chapter 13 filers are more likely to have nonexempt car
equity they would lose in a chapter 7 filing (26.1 percent versus 20.4
percent); chapter 13 filers also have higher average amounts of
nonexempt car equity ($1268 versus $720). (The medians in both
chapters are zero.) But, this effect goes away in a regression once we
control for income where income only is significant, suggesting the
150.

11 U.S.C. § 722 (2018).

151. See,
e.g.,
722
REDEMPTION
FUNDING,
INC.,
https://www.722redemption.com/ (last visited May 2, 2020); FRESH START LOANS,
http://www.freshstartloans.com/ (last visited May 2, 2020).
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effect is only because chapter 13 filers have higher incomes and
therefore are more likely to have nonexempt car equity.
Moving beyond chapter choice, we saw no connection between
exemptions and other actions in the bankruptcy case. One might
expect that debtors would be more likely to keep a car that had
economic value to them. The debtor's stated intent to surrender,
reaffirm, redeem, or ride-through a loan had no relationship with the
debtor's claim of an exemption in a car or the amount of nonexempt
equity in the car. Similarly, the amount of claimed exemptions or the
existence of nonexempt equity had no relationship with whether the
debtor's case was dismissed or discharged. Generally speaking,
statistical analyses only capture results that happen on average. It
certainly has to be true that some cases in our data reflect attempts
by debtors to preserve the economic value of an automobile, but our
data indicate economic value is not a motivator across most cases.
D.

Differences Across Households in Bankruptcy (Cluster Analysis)

Thus far, the analysis has looked at the data in the aggregate,
but different debtors come to bankruptcy court with different
circumstances. For example, a debtor with a car and a house often
will have both different resources (because the debtor could afford
both) and different post-bankruptcy goals than a debtor with only a
car. At the same time, rough categorizations based on home or car
ownership may obscure important differences. A married couple with
a modest home that is only worth a bit more than the two cars likely
is different than someone with a more valuable house and perhaps
even several cars.
As a proxy to measure the centrality of the debtor's car to the
bankruptcy case, we used the ratio of the value of the debtor's cars to
the debtor's total assets. Higher values imply that the debtor has
more of their wealth concentrated in automobiles. This measure had
a median of 0.19 and a mean of 0.33 and ranged from near zero to
Stated differently, the median household that filed
one. 1 52
bankruptcy in our sample entered bankruptcy with cars accounting
for about 20 percent of their total assets, and the average household
came to bankruptcy court with cars as one-third of their total assets.
As a shorthand, we refer to this ratio as CarWealth.
1.

Demographicsand Homeownership

One value of a clustering analysis is that it does not use arbitrary
groupings chosen by the researcher or indeed use any decisions from
the researcher at all about what observations belong in each group.
152. In 0.7 percent of the cases, debtors claimed a car was worth nothing,
sometimes omitting any value and sometimes entering zero. In these instances,
the debtor usually was claiming one of two things: the car was in need of repairs
such that it was valueless or someone else actually owned the car such that it
was worth nothing to the debtor. The cluster analysis excludes these cases.
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Such techniques are called "unsupervised" methods. Distinct groups
emerge from the data based on the data's characteristics, as borne out
by the descriptive statistics for the four clusters detailed in Table 3.
The cluster analysis shows that, when it comes to automobiles, there
are four distinct groups of households that file bankruptcy. 153 In
addition to being useful to explore differences in case outcomes when
focusing on cars, these groupings of filers by themselves provide
useful insights into how persons use the bankruptcy process.
Consisting of 49.2 percent of total cases with cars, the first cluster
is roughly the size of the other three clusters combined. Households
in this cluster have the lowest concentrations of CarWealth, with a
median of only 0.05. These debtors' CarWealth is so low because they
predominantly are homeowners (83.1 percent), with a median home
value of a bit under $136,000. Homeownership implies a mortgage,
which leads to the highest median amount of indebtedness among the
four clusters ($186,682) and the highest debt-to-income ratio (3.48).
These households are the best resourced, with a median annual
income of $40,164, almost $8000 higher than the median income of
the debtors in the next cluster. Consistent with their homeownership,
these debtors are more likely to file chapter 13.

153. Specifically, we did a k-means clustering that asked the computer to
assemble four groups such that the variance within each group was minimized
around the group's mean. To confirm that the four-group clustering solution was
most optimal, we did a post-cluster analysis consistent with Anna Makles, Stata
Tip 110: How to Get the Optimal k-Means Cluster Solution, 12 STATA J. 347, 347
(2012).
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TABLE 3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CLUSTERS OF
CAR VALUE/TOTAL ASSETS (CAR WEALTH)
Cluster
Medians
Car value/total assets
Number of cars
Total value of cars
Total equity in cars
Total assets
Home value (homeowners only)
Total debt
Annualincome
Debt-to-income ratio
Percentages
Chapter 13s
Homeowners
African American

1

2

3

4

0.05
1
$6,725
$1,564
$150,255
$135,938
$186,682
$40,164
3.48

0.31
1
$5,643
$902
$18,091
$63,884
$65,838
$32,316
1.62

0.59
1
$7,383
$528
$12,549
$15,709
$54,344
$31,122
1.42

0.84
1
$13,176
-$1,836
$15,801
$9,500
$53,459
$30,156
1.47

41.1%
83.0%
23.0%

29.1%
24.0%
21.5%

29.4%
6.8%
32.4%

37.6%
0.6%
34.0%

N
1,853
633
603
680
Notes: For bankruptcy debtors who owned a car, a k-means clustering was done
for the ratio of the value of the debtor's cars to the debtor's total assets. Analysis
suggested that four clusters was appropriate. Table 3 presents descriptive
statistics for each of the four clusters. Number of observations is the total in
each cluster. Some variables have missing observations. Race is from a subset
of 1,094 surveys with valid racial information.

Households in the first cluster are distinct demographically.
Debtors' average age is fifty-two, as compared to forty-seven or under
in the other three clusters. The debtors are more likely to be married
or live with a partner than those in clusters three and four. Both
differences may be explained by homeownership. The households
also are less likely to be African American. Overall, the first cluster
is closest to the stereotypical middle-class bankruptcy, particularly
one filed with the goal of saving the house. The debtor's cars most
likely are along for the ride.
Clusters two and three have increasing concentrations of
CarWealth (medians of 0.31 and 0.59). They have similar median
income levels ($32,316 and $31,112) and somewhat similar debt-toincome ratios (1.62 and 1.42). They are about equally as likely to be
in chapter 13 (28.6 percent and 29.4 percent). Clusters two and three
differ in two important ways.
First, there are many more
homeowners in cluster two, though not nearly as many as in the first
cluster. Indeed, cluster three includes only thirty-nine homes. The
median home value for homeowners is more than four times greater
in cluster two ($63,884) than in cluster three ($15,709).
An
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investigation of some of the houses in cluster three shows that they
are mobile homes or are located in very economically depressed cities
and towns, such as Flint, Michigan and Spencer, Tennessee, where
more than a third of the population is below the poverty line. 1 54
Debtors in cluster two also were more likely to be married or live with
a partner, which again may be a function of their higher
homeownership rate.
Second, there are fewer African American households in cluster
two (21.5 percent) than in cluster three (32.4 percent). Consistent
with their low homeownership rate, debtors in both clusters are more
likely to file chapter 7 than those households in the first cluster.
These cases seem to be the stereotypical middle-class bankruptcy
which does not include a house.
The highest concentration of African American households is in
cluster four (34.0 percent). Debtors in this cluster also own little else
besides their cars. The cars for the median filer in the cluster
represent 84 percent of the filer's total wealth. This household owns
$15,801 in assets, of which about $13,176 are their cars. For example,
a family may have two vehicles-such as a three-year-old Honda Civic
sedan with a trade-in value of about $9825, and an eight-year-old Kia
Sedona minivan with a trade-in value of $3350-plus household items
listed as worth a total of $2625.
Although cluster four has the highest car values of all the
clusters, the median filer has negative total equity in cars. The
median debtor in cluster four has $15,824 in car loans compared to
only $1769 in car loans for the median debtor in cluster one. With
such a high concentration of their wealth in cars, cluster four
represents the debtors most likely to be in bankruptcy to deal with
car debt.
Given that debtors in cluster four do not own homes and have the
lowest median incomes of all the clusters, almost all these debtors
seemingly should file chapter 7 from a purely financial perspective.
Nonetheless, they file chapter 13 at a higher rate (37.6 percent) than
the debtors in clusters two and three, in which at least some debtors
own homes. Indeed, cluster four's chapter 13 filing rate is closer to
the approximately 41 percent of debtors in the first cluster, 83 percent
of whom own homes.
Finally, across the clusters, the median total value of cars
increases. This is partly mechanical because the total value of the
cars is the numerator for the variable CarWealth used to cluster the
groups. At the same time, it is not a complete explanation because
154. This figure is based on the 2010 United States Census. See Poverty
Status in Past 12 Months (Flint, Michigan), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/j sf/pages/productview.xhtml?src
=CF; Poverty Stats in Past 12Months (Spencer, Tennessee), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/j sf/pages/productview.xhtml?src

=CF.
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total value of assets, the denominator in the variable, does not display
the same effect. For instance, cluster three has the lowest median
value for total assets. The implication is that car value is driving the
clustering more than total assets.
2.
Case Outcomes
Case outcomes across the four clusters vary, as shown in Table 4.
Cluster four varies the most from the other clusters. Debtors in
cluster four are more than twice as likely to have their chapter 7 cases
dismissed than cluster one, although given the low rate of chapter 7
dismissals generally this difference affects a small number of cases.
Chapter 13 cases in clusters three and four are 33 percent more likely
to be dismissed than clusters one and two. And the discharge rate in
cluster four is lower than the other three clusters; although, with the
number of pending chapter 13 cases, these results should be
interpreted with caution.
TABLE 4. CASE OUTCOMES BY CLUSTERS OF CAR VALUE/TOTAL
ASSETS
Clusters
1

2

3

4

\
1.8%

N

Chapter 7Filings
42

Dismissed

1.3%

1.8%

1.2%

3.5%

Discharged

83.0%

82.9%

80.3%

74.5%

Pending

15.8%

15.4%

18.5%

21.9%

1T.3

413

Dismissed
Discharged

27.1%
11.2%

26.6%
10.3%

36.2%
11.3%

35.9%
7.0%

29.S%
103%

411
142

Pending

61.2%

63.0%

52.5%

57.0%

00

825

%

1,936

Chapter 13Filings

Notes: For bankruptcy debtors who own cars, Table 4 reports case outcomes by
the original chapter at the time of filing. The outcome is measured as of the most

recent inspection of the docket, which is within six to eight weeks of filing for

one-third of the data, more than one year for one-third of the data, and more
than two years for one-third of the data. Outcomes are reported across four kmeans clusters of the ratio of the value of the debtor's cars to total assets,
capturing the concentration of the debtor's wealth in cars.
Debtors in cluster four come to bankruptcy with significantly
fewer resources than debtors in the other clusters, particularly
clusters one and two. They also owe more on their primary assets,
their cars, than those assets are worth. These debtors' cases higher
dismissal rate may reflect their lack of resources. 155 The cases
themselves may be thought of as "precarious" bankruptcies. The
155.

The percent of cases filed pro se does not vary across clusters.

DRIVEN TO BANKRUPTCY

2020]

321

households live unsteady financial lives pre-bankruptcy and their

cases are similarly insecure.
In contrast, recall that households in clusters one and two seem
to reflect the typical middle-class bankruptcy filings. Debtors' cases
in these two clusters end in dismissal less often than the average case
overall, particularly cases in cluster one. These debtors, in turn, are
better resourced. In short, although our data cannot provide concrete
reasons about the drivers of the clusters' discharge rates, it seems
that people with more resources are more likely to receive discharges.
Of course, if a primary motivation of people in cluster four for filing
bankruptcy is to keep their cars by discharging their other debts, that
cluster's lower discharge rate means that these households are less
likely to achieve what they want from bankruptcy.
Chapter 7 filers' intended disposition of their most valuable
vehicle across clusters further suggests that households in cluster
four may be especially concerned about keeping their cars. As shown
in Table 5, debtors in cluster four have higher rates of reaffirmation
than debtors in the other three clusters.
TABLE 5. INTENDED DISPOSITION OF MOST VALUABLE CAR IN
CHAPTER 7, FROM STATEMENTS OF INTENTION
Clusters
Surrender
Redeem
Reaffirm
Retain or no intention

1
8.5%
0.9%
57.7%
32.9%

2
12.3%
2.0%
53.8%
31.9%

3
13.0%
1.5%
59.1%
26.4%

4
15.4%
1.2%
64.2%
19.2%

\ll
11,
1,3%
58.8%
28.3%

N
167
18
841
404

Notes: For chapter 7 bankruptcy debtors who own cars subject to a lien, Table 5
reports the intended disposition of the most valuable car listed on the
bankruptcy schedules. The intended disposition is listed on Form 8, the
Statement of Intention, which is only filed in chapter 7 cases. The last row
captures both cases where Form 8 is missing or no intention for the automobile
is listed on Form 8. Outcomes are reported across four k-means clusters of the
ratio of the value of the debtor's cars to total assets, capturing the concentration
of the debtor's wealth in cars.
Reaffirmation levels must be considered with apparent ridethrough attempts captured in the final row because both leave an
auto loan in place (although the reaffirmation technically is a new
debt). When reaffirmation rates are added to ride-throughs, cluster
four is lower (83.4 percent) than cluster one (90.6 percent). The effect
can be seen in the rate of surrender, where cluster four is
surrendering at higher rates (15.4 percent) than cluster one (8.5
percent). Nonetheless, affirmatively indicating that the debtor wants
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to keep vehicles through reaffirmation implies that these debtors are
worried about losing their cars more so than debtors in other clusters.
In understanding the importance of these numbers, the overall
rates should be kept in mind. Although the rate of cluster four
debtors who surrender is about twice the rate of cluster one debtors
who surrender, five of six debtors in cluster four take steps to continue
their auto debt. Households in this cluster are the most likely to be
in bankruptcy because of auto debt, and most indicate that they want
to continue paying on that debt post-bankruptcy. Because many of
these households have negative equity in their cars, they essentially
are paying to file bankruptcy so that they can continue to pay more
for their cars than those cars are worth. 156
E.

Racial Dimensions of Cars in Bankruptcy

Households in cluster four not only are most likely to be in
bankruptcy because of auto debt but they also are most likely to be
African American. That the people in this cluster also have the
distinction of entering bankruptcy with the highest value of cars and
with auto loans dwarfing the value of those cars aligns with research
showing that African Americans pay more for cars and car loans. 157
As reported in Table 6, when comparing all cases in our sample,
African American households enter bankruptcy with slightly more
valuable cars at the median. And at the median, their most valuable
car is underwater-they owe more on the car than the car is worth.
Although African American households are less likely to own cars
than other households, this reverses when homeownership is
156. As reported in other work by this Article's authors, some people file
chapter 13 bankruptcy without paying their attorneys anything prior to filing,
termed "no money down" bankruptcy. Debtors who file chapter 13 with "no
money down" have financial characteristics more akin to chapter 7 filers than
other chapter 13 filers, suggesting that ability to pay attorneys is influencing
their chapter choice. In addition, African American households are more likely
to file chapter 13 with "no money down" than other households. See Foohey et
al., supra note 56. Debtors in clusters two and four are more likely to file chapter
13 with "no money down" than debtors in the other two clusters. African
American households in cluster two are more likely to file chapter 13 with "no
money down" than other households in that cluster. Recall that debtors in cluster
two are better resourced; they are the typical middle-class chapter 7 bankruptcy
filers. That African American households in this cluster nonetheless are more
likely to file "no money down" chapter 13 cases reflects our findings and
discussion in "No Money Down" Bankruptcy. In contrast, there is no race effect
across households in cluster four. All households in cluster four are equally likely
to file "no money down" chapter 13 cases, and they file with "no money down"
more often than debtors in the other clusters. This result further suggests that
cases in cluster four are "precarious" bankruptcies. These debtors have few
resources, including savings to pay their bankruptcy attorneys prior to filing.
157. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; Van Alst, supra note 32, at 6,
9 (finding not only that African Americans face higher auto loan interest rates
but also that they face higher prices for cars themselves and that trying to
negotiate for better prices does not result in lower car prices).

2020]

DRIVEN TO BANKRUPTCY

323

removed from the analysis, and African American households are
more likely to own a car if they do not own a home.

82.1%
55.1%
$7,098
-$236

89.1%
53.8%
$5,920
$1,069

*

All Other
Households

*

%car owners
%car owners without house
Value of most valuable car (median)
Equity in most valuable car (median)

African-American
Households

*

TABLE 6. COMPARISON OF HOUSEHOLDS IN BANKRUPTCY WITH CARS,
BY RACE

Notes: Table 6 reports differences in rates of car ownership and car value for
African American households as compared to all other households in the CBP.
Racial identification comes from a survey. There are 1,268 observations with
completed surveys and car information in the bankruptcy schedules. Statistical
significance at the p <.05 level is indicated in the last column by an asterisk and
computed using a chi-square test for the percentages and a Wilcoxon rank-sum
test for the medians.
This result parallels African Americans' lower homeownership
rate in the overall population. 15 8
In short, African American
households bring to bankruptcy the financial discrimination and
disparities they experience outside bankruptcy.
That these
households own more valuable cars in bankruptcy, while not having
any equity in those cars, is a symptom of these disparities.
Finally, though African American households constitute a larger
portion of the debtors in the cluster that seems most likely to file
bankruptcy to deal with cars and auto loans, it is important to
remember that almost two-thirds of the debtors in that cluster are of
other demographics.
African American households that file
bankruptcy overall are more likely than other households to own
more valuable cars and owe significant sums on those cars. But all of
the debtors in cluster four come to bankruptcy with this financial
profile, and their experiences in bankruptcy (case outcomes,
intentions to reaffirm) do not differ based on race. 159

158. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUARTERLY RESIDENTIAL VACANCIES AND
HOMEOWNERSHIP, FIRST QUARTER 2019 tbl.7 (2019), https://www.census. gov
/housing/hvs/files/qtrll9/Qll9press.pdf; see also Michelle Singletary, Black

Homeownership Is As Low As It Was When Housing DiscriminationWas Legal,
WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2018, 7:13 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/getthere/wp/2018/04/05/black-homeownership -is -as-low-as-it-was-when-housingdiscrimination-was-legal/ (citing Urban Institute data showing that the African

American homeownership rate is 41.2%, as compared to white Americans'
homeownership rate of 64%).

159. For instance, debtors in cluster four are equally likely to pay their
bankruptcy attorneys "no money down" when filing chapter 13.
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VI. KEEPING CARS THROUGH BANKRUPTCY
Cars and auto loans are a key component of Americans' lives, a
source of their financial problems, and a motivation to file
bankruptcy. Yet, before this Article, very little was known about
people's use of bankruptcy to deal with cars and auto loans. Indeed,
the most relevant scholarship to this Article is a twenty-year-old
study about chapter 7 filings that focused on reaffirmation
agreements generally, only discussing cars incidentally because so
many of the reaffirmations involved cars.160
A.

Holding onto Cars, Before and After Bankruptcy

Perhaps our most unremarkable finding is that bankruptcy filers
own cars at the same rate as other American households, but there is
importance in the unremarkable. In comparison to other Americans,
bankruptcy filers are less likely to own both a house and a car when
they file. 16 1 People seem to hold onto their cars while draining other
assets before filing bankruptcy, which is consistent with our prior
research about pre-bankruptcy asset depletion. 162 Importantly, it
also suggests that focusing on houses as the asset people file
bankruptcy to deal with misses a key component of people's filings.
Although there is a robust market for used cars, and people
perhaps could look to that market for a different vehicle if their cars
are under threat of seizure and sale, for many households, buying
another car may be a second-best solution as compared to filing
bankruptcy. 163 If their repossessed car was worth less than the
amount outstanding, debtors will still owe money to their auto
lender. 1 64 Because people have struggled to pay their debts as their
financial situations worsened, their credit scores almost certainly
have been undermined. 165 The only auto loan they likely will be
160. See Culhane & White, supra note 40, at 738.
161. See supra Table 1.
162. See generally Foohey et al., supra note 36 (finding that one out often long
strugglers sold their homes to avoid filing bankruptcy, and nearly half of long
strugglers pawned other property).
163. See EDMUNDS, USED VEHICLE REPORT: Q1 2019, at 1 (2019),
https:/static.ed.edmunds-media.com/unversioned/img/industry-center/insights
/used-market-reports/ql-2019-used-car-report.pdf (predicting that the used car
market will expand in 2019); Adrienne Roberts, Used-Car Sales Boom as New
Cars Get Too Pricey for Many, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 23, 2018, 7:46 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/used-car-sales-boom-as-new-cars-get-too-pricey-for
-many- 1537700401.
164. See Silver-Greenberg & Corkery, supra note 26.
165. Filing bankruptcy often increases people's credit scores. See Julapa

Jagtiani & Wenli Li, Credit Access After Consumer Bankruptcy Filing: New
Evidence, 89 Am. BANKR. L.J. 327, 329 (2015) (finding that chapter 7 and chapter
13 debtors' credit scores increase after filing bankruptcy); Katherine Porter, Life

After Debt: Understandingthe Credit Restraint of Bankruptcy Debtors, 18 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 1, 32 (2010) ("For those with credit scores below 300 when
they filed bankruptcy, the average bankruptcy penalty ratio is positive and equal
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approved for is an expensive, subprime loan that comes with a high
chance of default. 166 The price of that loan, plus other fees, means
that people's "new" used car likely will be worth less than their
previous car, while costing them more over the car's useful life. Given
that the people who file bankruptcy own cars with median values
significantly below that of non-bankrupt people, the idea of trading
down to an even older car is likely unappealing.
Filing bankruptcy, particularly chapter 7, may be more cost
effective, even when accounting for attorneys' fees, which can exceed
$1200.167 Bankruptcy also hopefully will result in a discharge of
unsecured debts, which should help people stay current on their auto
loans post-bankruptcy. 168 Filing bankruptcy to hold onto a car also
may be driven by the well-known endowment effect, where people
value a thing they already have more than the prospect of gaining
something they do not have. 169
Our results show not only that people enter bankruptcy owning
cars but also that most chapter 7 debtors want to use the process to
keep at least one of those cars. Including attempts at ride-through,
more than 85 percent of households state that they want to keep their
most valuable car, and more than three-quarters indicate that they
want to keep their second most valuable car. 170 A higher percentage
of debtors specify that they will surrender their second and third most
valuable vehicles. 171 Debtors also are less likely to indicate that they
want to enter into a reaffirmation agreement as to their third most
valuable vehicle. 17 2 Chapter 7 debtors thus are giving up what may
be their "extra" non-essential cars. 173 These findings suggest that, as
to automobiles, the value of bankruptcy lies in surrendering non-

to 173%, meaning that individuals obtain more credit after bankruptcy with
respect to the credit limit they would have if they did not file.").
166. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

167.

See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1058 (finding that chapter 7

attorneys' fees averaged $1,229 in 2015).
168. See id. at 1057.

169.

See Daniel Kahneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and

Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193, 194 (1991) (discussing the endowment
effect). Note that our data cannot prove that people file bankruptcy solely to keep
their cars. See infra Subpart VI.B.
170. See supra Table 5.
171. See supra Figure 1.
172. See supra Figure 1.
173. Exemptions limits may explain this result, in part. But given that few
cases we sampled included non-exempt equity in vehicles, it is likely that
exemptions alone cannot explain why 25 percent of chapter 7 debtors indicate
they will surrender their third most valuable vehicle. See supra Subpart V.C.
There also is a disparity in the relative percentage of debtors indicating they want
to reaffirm versus otherwise retain their most valuable and second most valuable
vehicles, and the percentage of debtors indicating they want to reaffirm versus
otherwise retain their third most valuable vehicle, which further suggests that
debtors are less concerned about keeping a third vehicle. See supra Figure 1 and
accompanying text.
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essential cars and discharging unsecured debts, potentially including
those stemming from the surrendered cars.
A more discrete yet still significant finding is that two-thirds of
chapter 7 debtors affirmatively indicate they want to reaffirm the
secured debt on their most valuable vehicle. 17 4
Although the
percentage of chapter 7 debtors entering bankruptcy with cars is
essentially the same as in the 1995 study focusing on reaffirmation
agreements, the percentage indicating that they will reaffirm the
accompanying auto loan has dropped almost ten percentage points
since 1995.175 The most obvious intervening event in the past twenty
years is BAPCPA's passage, which made seeking to reaffirm more
burdensome for debtors and attorneys. 176 Our results suggest that
rather than checking the "retain and reaffirm" box on the Statement
of Intention, more debtors are gambling that they will be able to ridethrough or otherwise negotiate "off the books" with their auto lenders.
Recall that the motivation behind BAPCPA's amendments to the
Bankruptcy Code provisions governing reaffirmation agreements was
to eliminate ride-through and curb "rogue" agreements.17 7 In reality,
BAPCPA's changes may have had the opposite effect, persuading
more debtors to bypass the reaffirmation agreement process.
Whether and how debtors actually keep their cars presents questions
ripe for further study, particularly given that a surprisingly low
percentage of debtors ostensibly keep their cars by taking out a
redemption loan. 178 Understanding the exact mechanisms by which
people retain vehicles in chapter 7 will allow for an assessment of how
to remedy the apparent gap between the law on the books and the law
on the ground. Importantly, our results presented in this Article
highlight this gap and show that how chapter 7 debtors keep their
cars is worthy of study.
Also worthy of underscoring is that, in both chapter 7 and chapter
13, most people are not keeping new or luxury vehicles. Chapter 7
households' most valuable car, based on Blue Book trade-in value, is
exemplified by the lowest-priced 2010 Ford F-150 pickup, in good
condition, with a regular cab that seats three people, and with
100,000 miles on the odometer. 179 In comparison, chapter 13
households' most valuable cars, again based on Blue Book trade-in
value, is exemplified by the same lowest-priced 2010 Ford F-150
pickup, again in good condition, but with a super cab that seats five
people, and with 75,000 miles on the odometer.18 0 Consistent with
other research about the people who file bankruptcy, these are
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
chapter

See supra Figure 1.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
See What's My Car Worth, supra note 124.
See id. For more examples of the vehicles owned by chapter 7 and
13 filers, see supra Subpart V.A.
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vehicles owned by households struggling to get by, not reckless
spenders who file the first moment they feel distressed. 181
B.

Pinpointing"CarBankruptcies"
The overall results show that households enter bankruptcy with
relatively low-value vehicles and predominately want to hold onto
most of their vehicles through bankruptcy. 182 Although these results
teach that consumer bankruptcy scholars should not singularly focus
on houses as the valuable (and difficult to replace) asset that people
seek to retain, they do not isolate what might be termed "car
bankruptcies"-those cases filed with the primary purpose of keeping
cars. The cluster analysis we used to separate bankrupt households
that own cars finds four distinct groups, two clusters of which
essentially do not own houses. 183 These two clusters include those
debtors most likely "driven to bankruptcy" because they own cars and
little else.
Debtors in these two clusters constitute about one-third of the
cases in our sample and are more or less evenly divided between the
two clusters. 184 To the extent that our data can pinpoint car
bankruptcies, these cases likely are them. Indeed, debtors in these
two clusters are more likely to indicate that they want to reaffirm
their car loan than debtors in the other two clusters, which may
suggest that they are more keenly interested in keeping cars.1 85
Because of data limitations, we cannot state with certainty that these
are car bankruptcies. Nonetheless, the differences between the
debtors in these two clusters versus other debtors tell the story of the
financial precarity of debtors who turn to bankruptcy for help owning
little more than cars.
Given the absence of houses, as a financial matter, it would be
reasonable to assume that most debtors in both clusters would file
chapter 7. Such is true of the debtors in one of the clusters (the third
cluster). These households file chapter 7 at rates slightly above the
national average. In contrast, households in cluster four are much
more likely to file chapter 13.186
Debtors in the fourth cluster differ from those in the third in one
noticeable way: their most valuable car is worth significantly more,
but they owe so much on it that the debtors hold negative equity in
the car. 187 Also, chapter 7 debtors in cluster four are even more likely

181. See Foohey et al., supra note 36, at 235-36 (discussing how long people
wait to file bankruptcy while seriously struggling with their debts).
182. See discussion supra Subpart V.B. and Table 3.
183. See supra Subpart V.D. 1.
184. Between clusters three and four, 47 percent of the cases are in cluster
three. See supra Table 3.
185. See supra Table 5 and Subpart V.D.2.
186. See supra Table 3.
187. See supra Table 3.
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to state that they intend to reaffirm their auto loans, lending
additional support to our theory that these are "car bankruptcies." 188
The high incidence of chapter 13 filing among debtors in cluster
four warrants further exploration.
For these households, filing
chapter 13 and paying to use bankruptcy to retain underwater cars,
which costs on average of about $3200 in attorneys' fees, makes little
financial sense absent other factors. 189 But if the only readily
available way to get a vehicle out of the impound lot is to file chapter
13, bankruptcy can be a rational solution. Filing bankruptcy also
probably makes sense to those debtors who are worried about getting
a new auto loan, particularly when they already are underwater on
their current auto loan and their credit scores are likely quite low.
Plus, bankruptcy attorneys presumably offer these debtors what is
termed "no money down" chapter 13 bankruptcy, by which debtors
pay filing and attorneys' fees through the repayment plan and their
attorneys will not ask for any fees prior to filing. 190 Debtors in cluster
four, regardless of race, are more likely to file "no money down"
chapter 13 cases. 191 In short, these debtors are more likely to be
offered the opportunity to file bankruptcy now, get their car back or
auto loan back on track now, and pay later. The rub, however, is that
only one-third of their chapter 13 cases will end with a debt
discharge. 1 9 2
The higher incidence of African American households in clusters
three and four is also notable. To the extent that these cases are "car
bankruptcies," African American households are more likely to be
driven to bankruptcy. 193 In prior research, we established that
African American households are more likely to file chapter 13 than
other similarly situated households and that "no money down"
bankruptcy is a crucial aspect of the racial disparity in chapter
choice. 194 "Car bankruptcies" likewise seem to be a crucial aspect of
the racial disparity in chapter choice.
Consumer bankruptcy itself cannot solve the racial disparities in
car prices, auto loan rates, ticketing, and repossessions that plague
African Americans. It also cannot address the fact that African
American households generally will arrive to the bankruptcy system

188. See supra Table 5.
189. See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1058 (finding that chapter 13
attorneys' fees averaged $3,217 in 2015).
190. See generally id.; supra note156 156 (summarizing "no money down"
bankruptcy). As discussed, supra note 151, debtors in cluster four are more likely
to file chapter 13 than debtors in other clusters.
191. See supra note 156 (detailing "no money down" bankruptcy's intersection
with the results of the cluster analysis).
192. See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1062.
193. See supra Tables 3, 6.
194. See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1082 (providing data that African
Americans are more likely to file chapter 13 and linking this trend with deferred
attorneys' fees in chapter 13).
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with more expensive cars and larger auto loans. 195 But it can address
the racial disparity in which households file chapter 7 versus chapter
13. In our prior work, we have discussed in detail how consumer
bankruptcy law and practice can change to address the racial
disparity in chapter choice. 19 6 The solutions we outlined-making
chapter 7 attorneys' fees payable in installments and reforming the
legal culture that historically has nudged African American
households to file chapter 13-are equally applicable to our results
about racial disparities in how cars are dealt with in bankruptcy in
this Article.19 7
In addition, our results lend support to prior location-specific
studies finding that African Americans file chapter 13 to combat
license suspensions and car repossessions due to parking tickets and
fines. 198 Why chapter 13 works particularly well in these scenarios
has to do with the scope of its debt discharge and the relative
certainty of repossessed cars being returned to owners. 199 But filing
chapter 13 is much more expensive than filing chapter 7 and is less
likely to end with a debt discharge. If chapter 7 offered a discharge
that included the same civil fines and fees currently included in
chapter 13's discharge, the households who turn to chapter 13 for help
with fees and fines that threaten their cars could file chapter 7.
Beyond paying less in attorneys' fees, they also would receive the
discharge vastly more often. 2 00
Whether and the extent to which the consumer bankruptcy
system is the best or even an appropriate venue to address racial
disparities in the issuance of parking tickets and other fines, as well
as the booting, impounding, and repossession of cars, is an important
question. Indeed, debtors in cluster four are the least likely to obtain
a discharge, which may reflect the severe lack of resources that bring
them to bankruptcy in the first place. 20 1 Nonetheless, our results
suggest that these nonbankruptcy disparities are manifest in the
bankruptcy system, which itself faces racial disparities in
outcomes. 202 Reforms to fines, fees, and car repossessions, at the very
least, are issues that should be considered in the context of consumer
bankruptcy.

195. See supra Table 6.
196. See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1103-05.
197. Id.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
199. See supra Subpart 111.C.
200. See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1062 (noting that debtors receive a
discharge in over 95 percent of chapter 7 cases).
201. See supra Table 4.
202. See Foohey et al., supra note 56, at 1065-66 (discussing the financial
impact of bankruptcy chapter choice and the correlation between chapter choice
and race).
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VII. BANKRUPTCY: A SUBPRIME END TO AMERICA'S "LOVE AFFAIR"
WITH CARS?

Americans' long-time so-called "love affair" with their cars is
more accurately a reflection of a need for transportation to maintain
jobs, get food, and provide for family members. 20 3 Now is an
especially propitious time to document what happens to cars in
bankruptcy. The auto loan marketplace is booming, particularly for
subprime loans. 2 04 Analysts are predicting increasing repossessions.
And reports that the American middle class continues to struggle are
making headline news. 205
The results presented in this Article show that the people who
file bankruptcy have similar levels of automobile ownership as the
nonbankrupt population, but they own less expensive cars, on which
they owe relatively more to secured lenders. The results support
intuitions that people will keep paying their auto loans as long as
possible and suggest that auto debt is playing some role in
contributing to financial distress. The results further show that most
people who file bankruptcy intend to keep their cars. Cars and auto
loans play an important role in the consumer bankruptcy system.
If the auto loan marketplace continues its present course, more
people will file bankruptcy to deal with their cars and car loans. More
subprime auto loans will lead to more defaults and repossessions.
Subprime borrowers will have fewer nonbankruptcy options to deal
with their expensive loans. Instead, more people may turn to
bankruptcy, in part, to help save their current cars, renegotiate their
auto loans, and discharge other debts. The data in this Article should
guide further studies. Understanding whether and how debtors
ultimately keep their cars will increase the system's effectiveness in
helping people who turn to bankruptcy to deal with their cars and
auto loans.
Finally, a crucial aspect of the story of cars in bankruptcy is the
financial fragility of the people who file owning little more than their
cars. These households often pay more to use bankruptcy to continue
paying on underwater auto loans. 206 They also bring the racial
disparities they face outside bankruptcy with them into the system,
which itself has proven less useful for African Americans, especially
to obtain a debt discharge. 20 7 If the auto market continues to expand,
and if cities continue to impound vehicles for unpaid tickets and other
fines, not only should more households look to bankruptcy to deal
203. See Emily Badger, The Myth of the American Love Affair with Cars,
WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2015, 2:26 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2015/01/27/debunking-the-myth-of-the-american-love-affair-withcars/.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
205. See supra text accompanying note 13.
206. See supra Subpart VI.B.
207. See supra Subpart VI.B.
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with their cars and auto loans, but these households will continue to
find a system that works differently for some households. Until the
racial disparities in the consumer bankruptcy system are addressed,
bankruptcy will continue to compound racial disparities in household
finance and wealth.

